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I Heard Someone Say 
 Paul Celan 
 
 
I heard someone say there exists  
in the water a stone and a ring 
and over the water a word  
that lays the ring over the stone. 
 
I saw my poplar go down to the water, 
I saw how her arm reached down to the deep, 
saw her roots pleading upward toward heaven for night. 
 
I did not hurry after her, 
I only picked up from the earth that crumb 
that has the shape and loft of your eyes, 
I took from your throat the chain of remarks, 
which I laid round the table on which the crumb lay. 
 
And saw my poplar no more.  
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I. Introduction 
 
 
 
Of the many categories of media that attempt to represent the period between 
1939 and 1945, the work of Ka-Tzetnik 135633 stands as perhaps the least likely and the 
least canonical entry point into the historical realities of what is commonly referred to as 
the Holocaust. Publishing under a pseudonym derived from the German acronym for 
camp inmates (KZ, for Konzentrationslager) followed by his tattooed serial number, 
135633, the author was uniquely positioned to inform Israelis (including the children of 
many survivors, as well as those who were living in the Yishuv and not directly impacted 
by the Sho’ah) about camp experiences—with his first book appearing in 1946.1 Over the 
next forty years, Ka-Tzetnik produced a total of six works that are commonly published 
in Israel as the sextet Salamandra: A Chronicle of a Jewish Family in the Twentieth 
Century.2 Each book concerns a different aspect of Ka-Tzetnik’s life during and after his 
time in Auschwitz, reenacted through his fictionalized persona, Harry Preleshnik, and 
two of the books allegedly focus on what he believes to have been the experiences of his 
younger siblings.3 Despite the popularity of the books and the singular celebrity of their 
author in Israel, the books have proved immensely controversial among scholars and 
readers alike due to the perceived vulgarity and literality with which they represent camp 
                                                 
1
 Galia Glasner-Heled, “Reader, Writer, and Holocaust Literature: The Case of Ka Tzetnik,” Israel Studies 
12 num. 3 (Fall 2007): 111. 
2
 Omer Bartov, “Kitsch and Sadism in Ka-Tzetnik’s Other Planet: Israeli Youth Imagine the Holocaust,” 
Indiana University Press, Jan 31 1997, para. 9. 
3
 Jeremy Popkin, “Ka-Tzetnik 135633: The Survivor as Pseudonym,” New Literary History 33, no. 2 
(Spring 2002): 343-4. 
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experiences, their depiction of mental illness in relation to survival and trauma, 
depictions of Jewish complicity in the suffering of their fellows, and the centrality of 
sexual themes throughout the series. 
Though largely criticized by scholars, Ka-Tzetnik’s works occupy a unique space 
in the history of Holocaust literature. The books first appeared amid a “culture of silence” 
in Israel, during which many survivors chose not to speak publicly or even privately 
about their experiences within the camp system. As such, the first two books—entitled 
Salamandra and House of Dolls—proved to be formative of some early conceptions of 
the Holocaust experience by the children of survivors who did not discuss their 
experiences. The author of these books, which were not originally published as either 
fiction or memoir and seem to have been received as rather a mix of both,4 retained his 
anonymity under a pseudonym until 1961, when his appearance at the Eichmann trial in 
Jerusalem revealed him to be Yehiel De-Nur. 5  These aspects of De-Nur’s elusive 
personal history, as well as the historical position of his books in time, preserve him as a 
point of interest in studying the Holocaust and its literature. As this essay will show, there 
is more even than that to distinguish De-Nur from many other writers of the period.  
The historical and literary merits of the books have been largely contested, as this 
essay will show, and scholars have more or less dismissed them from the Holocaust 
canon. Despite this ostensible rejection, Ka-Tzetnik’s sextet seems to have sustained 
popularity in Israel, and selected books have been translated from the Hebrew into 
                                                 
4
 Ibid., 345. 
5
 Omer Bartov, “Kitsch and Sadism in Ka-Tzetnik’s Other Planet: Israeli Youth Imagine the Holocaust,” 
Indiana University Press, Jan 31 1997. 
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English, Yiddish, German, Polish, Russian, Portuguese, Spanish, and Arabic. 6  Some 
scholars view his works, at worst, as pornographic kitsch that panders to young, excitable 
audiences at the expense of the reputation of survivors; others, at best, see him as a 
messenger attempting to represent his deceased family in the form of a literary memorial.  
In order to unpack the complexity of the many subjects that converge around the 
figure Ka-Tzetnik 135633, this essay will attempt to address the books themselves 
(focusing on House of Dolls, Piepel, Shivitti: A Vision, and Phoenix Over the Galilee 
specifically), with an emphasis on the theoretical questions they pose and the historical 
impact of the books in Israel. The components of this investigation will include an 
analysis of the position of the author’s identity as a framing mechanism for the reception 
of the books; an attempt to unravel the ontology of testimony and the role of the witness; 
a comparative look into various literary representations of the Mussulman; a discussion 
of the ways in which Jewish complicity is depicted and debated in Holocaust literatures; a 
reconstruction of the various forms of sexual violence that took place during this period 
based on historical documentation; and a discussion of the ways in which the books have 
been politicized in Israel. Each of these elements figure significantly into Ka-Tzetnik’s 
works, but they also form some of the central questions of what is at stake in representing 
the Holocaust.  
With all of these moving pieces, this paper will be anchored by the themes of 
dehumanization (the dismissal basic human needs and rights) and depersonalization (the 
subsequent loss of identity) throughout, and the range of consequences these can have on 
subjectivity, narrative constructions, and cultural conceptualizations of history. In 
                                                 
6
 Omer Bartov, “Kitsch and Sadism in Ka-Tzetnik’s Other Planet: Israeli Youth Imagine the Holocaust,” 
Indiana University Press, Jan 31 1997. 
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opposition to the anonymization of victims, accounts, and narratives, this paper will 
argue for the preservation of the individual, named self against the generalizing 
emplotments of history that are pliable to the large-scale goals and tastes of nations. 
Using the work of Ka-Tzetnik as a central point of discussion, this paper will develop this 
position with an attempt to argue for the viability of the imagination as a tool for coping 
with trauma via the production of personal narratives, especially in the way that such 
subjective richness can provide fertile narrative grounds by which survivors could lay 
new roots in a modernized, volatile world. The exclusion of the personal, the subjective, 
from national emplotments of history risk that such widespread violence could occur 
again, in the sense that the reduction of the personal continues the way that violence has 
been justified by dehumanizing others. By acknowledging the individual traumas of the 
past, along with their philosophic implications, the human race acknowledges a global, 
nationless responsibility that everyone holds to ensure that genocide is never repeated.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Allen      8
II. “Planet Auschwitz” and the Bifurcated Self 
 
 
 
 As an historical figure, Ka-Tzetnik himself poses many interesting questions 
about the nature of testimony and the position of the witness—pointing, in particular, to 
the inextricable nature of these supposed opposites. By the standards of conventional 
firsthand storytelling, his Salamandra sextet seems to reject many central tenets. When 
the books were published, they were not identified as either fiction or memoir, and the 
author views them as a “chronicle of the planet Auschwitz”7 that speaks for the dead. 
Regardless of how they were marketed, the books appeared in Palestine (Eretz Yisra’el)8 
and, later, in the state of Israel, during a time when Holocaust narratives were not in large 
circulation for various political and cultural reasons. In their refusal to claim a single 
author, the books did not lose credibility among young Israelis but seemed rather to gain 
it due to the author’s use of the KZ pseudonym followed by his tattoo number. This leads 
into further questions about identity, wherein the suspense around the author’s personal 
identity was not resolved until 1961 when the author testified at the Eichmann Trial in 
Jerusalem and revealed himself to be Yehiel De-Nur. The revelation of Ka-Tzetnik’s 
identity was coincident with, as Michael Levine has termed it, “the unprecedented advent 
                                                 
7
 Here Bartov quotes Ka-Tzetnik’s own testimony, given on the witness stand at the trial of Adolf 
Eichmann in 1961. Omer Bartov, “Kitsch and Sadism in Ka-Tzetnik’s Other Planet: Israeli Youth Imagine 
the Holocaust,” Indiana University Press, Jan 31 1997, para 22.  
8
 Within a Hebrew context, Palestine is referred to as Eretz Yisra’el (the land of Israel) prior to the 
declaration of statehood.  
Allen      9
of a legal narrative.”9 At this formative moment in Israeli history, as the world watched, 
De-Nur experienced the collision of his two identities (his pre- and post-incarceration 
selves); a confrontation with Adolf Eichmann, the man who personally sent him to 
Auschwitz; the enormous task of verbalizing legal testimony when he had before 
provided textual representations written outside of his own point of view; and, under the 
pressure of all of these factors, De-Nur ultimately fainted on the witness stand.  
The aforementioned issues surrounding De-Nur’s identity and position as a 
witness to genocide begs the further development of the relationship between fiction and 
testimony, showing that the two are not clearly distinct opposites but actually dialectical 
components of the same process of narrativization. As Yael Feldman has observed, “the 
opposition between documentary realism and mediated recollection, raw testimony and 
literary reconstruction, is not so final after all.”10 Taking this into account, this section 
will investigate the role of the imagination in the construction of testimony and the many 
ways in which the mind of the subject can interfere with (or assist in) the production of 
historical accounts. In De-Nur’s case especially, such an investigation leads into a 
discussion of mental illness and of survivor’s guilt in particular—culminating in an 
examination of the ways in which the imaginative reconstruction of past traumas can lead 
to personal healing and, perhaps, into large-scale healing by ensuring that the injustices 
of the past are never forgotten by modern citizens.  
 Due to the authorial ambiguities described above, combined with his works’ 
representations of sexual violence and Jewish complicity, many have contested the 
                                                 
9
 Michael G. Levine. A Weak Messianic Power: Figures of a Time to Come in Benjamin, Derrida, and 
Celan (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014), 35. 
10
 Yael Feldman, “Whose Story Is It, Anyway? Ideology and Psychology in the Representation of the 
Shoah in Israeli Literature,” in Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the Final Solution, ed. 
Saul Friedlander (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 228. 
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viability of the works as appropriate (or accurate) entry points for modern readers to 
access the historical reality of the Holocaust. However controversial, the work of Ka-
Tzetnik 135633 claims a unique position in the history of Holocaust literature. Following 
the liberation of the camps in 1945, displaced survivors across Europe were left with a 
limited understanding of who among them had survived, or didn’t, and to where they 
should proceed. De-Nur was among this number, and spent an amount of time, like many 
others, recuperating in a Displaced Persons Camp (DP Camp) in Italy,11 in which he 
likely heard the stories of other people in the Camp that were outside of his personal 
scope of experience, and which fed into his Salamandra: A Chronicle of a Jewish Family 
in the Twentieth Century works.12  
The first installment appeared in Hebrew in 1946, but it was not until 1948 that 
Israeli statehood was declared and its doors officially opened to Holocaust survivors 
around the world. At this time in Israel, however, many survivors were reticent about 
their experiences and lived separately from the people of the Yishuv;13 consequently, the 
publication of Ka-Tzetnik’s works in Hebrew privileged them as Israeli-accessible 
representations of a Holocaust experience. Witness accounts of the Holocaust, either 
written or verbal, were rare due to the political position of Israel as a foundling state 
attempting to define itself in opposition to the traumas of the past. About the tenuous 
relationship between the Holocaust and emergent Israeli ideologies, Omer Bartov has 
observed: 
                                                 
11
 Milner, Iris. “The ‘Gray Zone’ Revisited: The Concentrationary Universe in Ka. Tzetnik’s Literary 
Testimony,” Jewish Social Studies: History, Culture, and Society n.s. 14 no. 2 (Winter 2008), 113. 
12
 Ibid., 114.  
13
 The cumulative result of three Aliyahs (translating literally to ascensions), or migrations, to Israel 
beginning in the late 1800s, the New Yishuv is indicative of the Jewish population in Palestine (Eretz 
Israel) prior to the declaration of Israeli statehood. 
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Since the state of Israel was presented as the definitive and only possible answer 
to the (destruction of the) Jewish Diaspora, and because the new Israeli Jews—
armed, aggressive, and victorious—were depicted as the polar opposite of the 
defenseless, weak, and submissive Jewish victims of European persecution, 
identifying with one’s ancestor’s in Exile was ideologically a contradiction in 
terms, especially so far as young Sabras (Jews born in Israel) were concerned. 
(Bartov para. 11) 
 
For young Israel, the very fact of recent victimhood had the potential to undermine the 
national position of heroism and strength. However, Ka-Tzetnik’s books defiantly 
circulated among young readers especially, resulting in “the common view in Israel of 
Ka-Tzetnik as an icon of Hebrew-language representation of the Holocaust.”14 Publishing 
under the pseudonym Ka-Tzetnik 135633 seemed to only enhance his celebrity, rather 
than dissuade people of his credibility as a single author—especially given that his works 
appeared so soon after the liberation of the camps, with little time to gain enough 
information to possibly fabricate an experience from hearsay.15  
On the whole, Ka-Tzetnik’s sextet was not only among the first Holocaust 
narratives to appear in Israel, but also uniquely positioned to claim credibility as a 
universalized Holocaust narrative in his use of the KZ pseudonym, followed by his tattoo 
number. In this way, Ka-Tzetnik’s retention of a pseudonym is seen as a faithful rendition 
of the Lager experience, in which real people were reduced to anonymous numbers that 
could be treated in any manner that served the advancement of the Reich. This may be 
seen as an act of solidarity and compassion that, as Jeremy Popkin has noted, is in 
keeping with the notion that “only the deliberate abandonment of any claim to personal 
                                                 
14
 Omer Bartov, “Kitsch and Sadism in Ka-Tzetnik’s Other Planet: Israeli Youth Imagine the Holocaust,” 
Indiana University Press, Jan 31 1997, para. 1.  
15
 Ibid., para. 25. 
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identity can convey the truth of what Holocaust victims experienced.”16 By this line of 
thinking, the author’s choice to remain anonymous was not meant to generate mystery 
around his works, but to accredit them to all those who experienced Nazi-enforced 
depersonalization in the camps.  
 Other readers have not viewed Ka-Tzetnik’s works so favorably. The first three 
books—Salamandra, House of Dolls, and Piepel—proved to be deeply polarizing for 
scholars and readers alike. One of the primary criticisms lodged against the books is the 
prevalence of sexual themes, particularly in the case of the latter two which depict, in 
particular, the institutionalized sexual abuse of children within the Lager system. Instead 
of considering the texts as breakthrough testimonies during a time of historical 
repression, Bartov sees the books as consciously engineered to garner attention and 
celebrity for the author, and their treatment of rape as a part of this mechanism: 
In the 1950s and 1960s Israeli youngsters often read Ka-Tzetnik because he was 
the only legitimate source of sexually titillating and sadistic literature in a still 
puritanical and closed society, with the result that the Holocaust somehow became 
enmeshed in their minds with both repelling and fascinating pornographic images. 
(Bartov para. 2) 
 
By this argument, Ka-Tzetnik’s works have severely damaged public conceptions of the 
survivor at a time when such conceptions were precarious (and often suspicious) in the 
first place. By eroticizing the Holocaust and marketing it to young Israelis who had only 
a limited understanding of the historical reality of the Lager, Ka-Tzetnik may be seen as 
deliberately corrupting modern conceptions of the historical past. Given this perspective, 
                                                 
16
 Jeremy Popkin, “Ka-Tzetnik 135633: The Survivor as Pseudonym,” New Literary History 33, no. 2 
(Spring 2002): 354. 
Allen      13
Bartov’s appraisal of the works as “kitsch” that is culpable of “contaminating survivors” 
is a conceivable one.17 
Some have taken this line of argumentation further, positing that Ka-Tzetnik’s 
work was not only disgraceful to the survivors, but also corruptive to the forming 
sexuality of Sabras in Israel. In 2007, an Israeli filmmaker named Ari Libsker produced a 
documentary, Stalags, that details the history of an underground literary genre that 
emerged in Israel in the early 1950s. This genre concerned itself with the writing of 
pornographic scenes occurring between a powerful, often blonde, Nazi woman and a 
Jewish man incarcerated in the camps. These scenes entail the torture and rape of the 
victim until, finally, the victim wins out and rapes and murders his captors. The proposed 
ramifications of this genre, in the early days of Israeli statehood, suggest that many 
Sabras (and, later, children of survivors) read these works during the “culture of silence” 
and accepted them as historical reality, possibly “[reinforcing] their fantasies about the 
terrible events… generated by the reluctance of adults and surrounding society to speak 
about the Holocaust.” 18  A further proposed consequence of these works is that the 
burgeoning sexualities of these young Israelis were morally and psychologically 
influenced by the depravity that titillated them when no other pornographic materials 
were available.  
In the trailer for Stalags, Libsker’s documentary, a man is interviewed with his 
face blacked out onscreen and his voice distorted to hide his identity. The anonymous 
man claims that his father was a survivor, and had one of these novels hidden away in 
                                                 
17
 Omer Bartov, “Kitsch and Sadism in Ka-Tzetnik’s Other Planet: Israeli Youth Imagine the Holocaust,” 
Indiana University Press, Jan 31 1997, para 33. 
18
 Galia Glasner-Heled, “Reader, Writer, and Holocaust Literature: The Case of Ka Tzetnik,” Israel Studies 
12 num. 3 (Fall 2007): 121. 
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their home. The man found it and read it during his pubescent years, causing, as he 
claims, aspects of the Holocaust and its torture systems in particular to become fetishized 
to a degree of obsession that lingers into the present day. Though a government task force 
recalled all the books and sought them out for destruction, the man in the trailer 
nonetheless drags out a stack of probably a hundred of these books.19 These Stalags 
novels were, of course, dehumanizing accounts of events that did not occur, but Libsker 
cites Ka-Tzetnik’s House of Dolls as the root cause for this genre, claiming that the book 
revealed that there was a market for exploitative Holocaust literature. However, the 
Stalags genre is notably distinct from House of Dolls, given that there are only two 
scenes sexually explicit scenes in the latter over the course of a full-length book; whereas 
the Stalags works focused on sexual and violent acts exclusively. Further, the role of 
fictionality in each of these seems to come from very different places: Ka-Tzetnik’s 
voiced intention was to present his younger siblings’ stories as he understood them, and 
the Stalags works seem to have been created merely to generate profit.  
Others have viewed Ka-Tzetnik’s inclusion of sexual violence as brave, asserting 
that the works take a stand for many victims whose testimonies were silenced. As is all 
too common cross-culturally, many survivors of sexual violence were reluctant to give 
testimony about their experiences, and, by this line of thinking, Ka-Tzetnik’s books insist 
on the inclusion of rape and pedophilia in modern discussions of the Holocaust. Recalling 
that the works are intended to represent the experiences of his younger siblings, with 
whom he was never reunited after their separation in the ghetto, the idea that people 
could receive sexual gratification from his work must have been far from De-Nur’s mind 
                                                 
19
 A full version of this documentary could not be obtained, but the trailer can be viewed by following this 
link, or by searching “Stalags Ari Libsker Documentary” on YouTube: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2htNs9d_6q8 
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at the time of writing (otherwise, he is worse even than Bartov condemns him for). 
Bartov describes the books as pornography and, as it turns out, the genre is a difficult one 
to define on a unanimous plane. As an attempt to create such a definition, aggregated 
from various sources, Miryam Sivan suggests the following: 
…the creator’s intent to endorse, condone, or encourage degrading or abusive 
sexual behavior; to degrade women for male sexual entertainment and 
gratification… to produce sexual feelings and actions in the consumer; to elicit 
the release in fantasy of a compelling impulse… Not one of these intentions is 
relavant to Ka-Tzetnik’s House of Dolls or Piepel. (Sivan 208) 
 
Though, naturally, elements of her definition are debatable, her point is well taken as it 
relates to De-Nur and the question of authorial intention. Though the personal 
subjectivities of writers are inaccessible to their readers, one can nonetheless gather from 
the author’s statements that his intention was not to sexually arouse his readers, but rather 
to demonstrate the extremism of Nazi depersonalization tactics and tortures, and, likely, 
to produce in the reader the same degree of outrage and repulsion that the writer felt. As 
will be discussed in detail later on, De-Nur may have imagined the traumas of his siblings 
in sexual terms not only due to this expediency of emotion, but perhaps also due to 
mental illness and survivor’s guilt. 
 In an attempt to illustrate the kinds of explicit representations that would warrant 
such polarized perspectives, a few scenes stand out in particular. As has been mentioned, 
the second book of the sextet, House of Dolls, dramatizes the experience of a young girl 
who is forced to work in an Auschwitz brothel in service to the German soldiers. Prior to 
“Enjoyment Duty,” the girls are forcibly sterilized in the so-called “Science Institute.” 
Ka-Tzetnik describes the girl, Daniella’s, post-surgical experience this way: 
It wasn’t until late in the day that Daniella felt the pain begin to let up. The savage 
fire which had been raging in her lower abdomen subsided somewhat. The 
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scorching heat that had been through her vagina still fulgurated and lapped within 
her full strength. The focus of the pain—at first concentrated on one point where 
it drilled with a white-hot drill—dulled somewhat as the pain spread throughout 
the body. (Ka-Tzetnik 154) 
 
In this passage, one may find evidence of Ka-Tzetnik’s unflinchingly literal depictions of 
the physical conditions of the Lager—another criticism often lodged against the author. 
This is the only time in the book that the word “vagina” appears outright, and, notably, it 
is within a medical, as opposed to a sexual, context. In this description, the female body 
is presented as a particular site of Nazi violence, due to the way that the vagina is 
conceived of as an instrument for both the advancement and purification of the Reich as 
well as its undoing. As the next section will explore in detail, issues of Jewish 
procreation, and miscegenation in particular, were dealt with expressly in the Nuremberg 
Laws toward the end of preserving Nazi biopolitical positions. As we’ll see later, the kind 
of sexual violence that Ka-Tzetnik renders in these works may not align exactly with 
historical reality; still, Ka-Tzetnik positions female sexuality here as yet another aspect of 
Jewish life that was exploited to benefit the Aryan agenda, in the form of the gratification 
of German soldiers.  
 Although the passage mentioned above contains the only overt reference to 
female genitalia, sexual abuse and rape do not escape representation. Further in House of 
Dolls, Ka-Tzetnik describes Daniella’s first term of “Enjoyment Duty”: 
“German soldiers will teach you!” Out of the loud debauchery rises the hoarse, 
heavy voice of the German croaking in her ear. Her eyes are shut. The voice has a 
rubicund, drunken face, a leather jacket: “13”… “German soldiers will teach 
you!” The face of the Neanderthal mummy is lying on her, pawing at her, licking 
her face. She lies bound as in a cage, knees astraddle, unable to move a limb. 
Can’t escape. Sparks. (Ka-Tzetnik 168) 
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In addition to containing Daniella’s perspective, through the third person limited, this 
passage also contains another important voice: that of the Master Kalefactress, a female 
German criminal whose prewar prison sentence was redirected to a position of relative 
power in Auschwitz. This was a very common practice throughout the concentrationary 
system, as much of the existing societal infrastructure of the time (including the prisons) 
was repurposed to suit wartime scarcity as well as the ambition of Hitler’s 
megalomaniacal construction projects (hence the call for Labor Kommando, and other 
forms of forced labor). Upon entering the Auschwitz brothel, the Master Kalefactress 
interprets the girls’ fearfulness as vain shows of propriety, and consistently berates them 
with the warning, “German soldiers will teach you!” Here, the Kalefactress’s words 
surface in Daniella’s consciousness as she is raped—perhaps indicating the degree to 
which Lager depersonalization techniques have advanced in her psyche. 
 The presence of empowered German criminals also plays an important role in Ka-
Tzetnik’s third work, Piepel, the story of a seven-year-old boy who is forced to work as 
both maid and sexual servant to the Block Guard of his appointed barrack. Criminals, 
historically, were frequently appointed as Block Guards, and, in Piepel, the guards pass 
the young boy, Moni, hand-to-hand in exchange for various goods from each other 
which, due to their privileged positions within the camp, only they are able to procure. In 
what is probably the most visceral and heart-rending scene in the book, Moni describes a 
night with the “Block Chief”: 
I knew that if it weren’t for the fact that the Block Chief was all worked up just 
then, my eyes would never have opened again. He kept me alive just so he could 
shoot his load. And then, with the last ounce of strength in you, you try to keep 
the love-making going and to keep the Block Chief’s mind off your life with all 
the love-tricks you learned in your year in Auschwitz… And again you tear open 
your eyes. Again your throat is in the clamp of the Block Chief’s hands. Don’t 
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you know what the Block Chief screams then? Is it only once that you’ve heard 
it? By this time you’ve stopped knowing what you’re in for until the Block Chief 
has shot his load. Then you’re torn between two fears: if you draw out the love-
play, you’re terrified at the thought of dozing off in the middle; if you end the 
petting and fondling too soon, you’re terrified at the thought that the Block Chief 
will croak you for it as soon as he’s done. (Ka-Tzetnik 111) 
 
Here, the departure from the first person into the second seems to indicate the way that 
Moni evacuates his own subjectivity as he is traumatized. This method of self-evacuation 
is present in both Moni and Daniella’s depictions. Following her encounter with the 
“Neanderthal mummy,” Daniella’s mind proceeds into a series of flashbacks and vague 
introspections that do not directly relate to the trauma she is experiencing; similar to the 
way in which Moni’s mind detaches from his first-person identity to consider the 
circumstances of an unfortunate other. Throughout Piepel, Moni manifests an imaginary 
friend that he can alternately admonish, comfort and pity; while Daniella’s mind surges 
through fragments of memories and speech that attempt to explain her current situation. 
Both coping methods may be seen as associated with the author himself in his 
predilection for anonymity in the presentation of his texts, in the sense that both Daniella 
and Moni attempt to evacuate their own subjectivities in order to deflect some of the 
personally erosive effects of trauma.  
Despite this similarity, the way that Moni’s abuse is described contains many 
notable departures from the techniques used to describe Daniella’s. In House of Dolls, the 
language is very formal and contains words such as “fulgurated” and “Neanderthal”; 
whereas the above passage from Piepel is rife with such coarse slang as “shot his load” 
and “love-play.” One possible explanation for this may be that the books were published 
by different companies—though they were both translated by Moshe M. Kohn—and, 
unfortunately, the American market for Holocaust media does not display a remarkable 
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taste for the philosophic or the artful. Given that Piepel was released after House of Dolls 
(with first publications in English appearing in 1956 and 1961, respectively), it is 
possible that the latter publisher sought a wider market by amplifying the degradation of 
the events depicted.  The first three works of the sextet, notably, seem not to have been 
translated by someone chosen by the author, as occurred with later works in the series, 
but rather by the publishing houses involved.  
Another significant disparity between the styles of House of Dolls and Piepel is 
an obvious one: their difference of point of view. House of Dolls, the second novel of the 
sextet, is in third person, and renders Harry (Ka-Tzetnik’s fictionalized persona) as a 
character in the narrative with whom she maintains a relationship in the ghetto, prior to 
her deportation to Auschwitz. During their time together in the ghetto, and even after a 
Nazi Aktion has separated them, the narrative alternately focalizes through Daniella and 
Harry’s perspectives. Piepel, on the other hand, is written in first person and contains 
only a peripheral mention of Harry, as Moni is still too young to have very clear 
memories of his pre-incarceration life. Other than Shivitti: A Vision, the final work in the 
series and one that will be discussed at length later in this section, Piepel is the only book 
written in the first person and, arguably, may also be the furthest from the personal 
experience of the author. Without Harry’s presence in the book, the first person seems 
only to be accomplished by the total removal of the author himself from the events 
described, and in this way Ka-Tzetnik is able to inhabit Moni’s mind more fully than 
Daniella’s.  
The first novel, titled Salamandra, concerns the author’s experience specifically, 
as depicted through his fictional persona, Harry Preleshnik. While aligning with what 
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little is known about the facts of De-Nur’s personal experience in Auschwitz, House of 
Dolls and Piepel stand far outside of the author’s conceivable scope of experience. 
Though he may have heard the stories of other survivors in a Displaced Person’s Camp, 
De-Nur never saw his siblings again after they were separated in the ghetto and, further, 
the historicality of the conditions that Daniella and Moni experience in these books is 
dubious. Despite these layers of removal, the author continued to attest their absolute 
truth as the voices of the dead. Given these discrepancies, in combination with the 
possible damage the works may have done to the disparate population in early Israel, the 
dismissal of these works from the canon seems based on their incongruity with historical 
reality and their social impact upon publication. However, the works were written out of 
reverence for his family and as a way to mourn their destruction, and in this way 
constitute a form of personal narrative that engages the imagination in pursuit of healing. 
Possibly overwhelmed by his experiences, emotions, and suffering from Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder, De-Nur may have imagined his siblings’ suffering and torture in sexual 
terms due to the expediency with which such representations might raise a reaction in the 
reader—possibly one that is meant to match the extremity of feeling in the author. By 
externalizing these imagined narratives—though the author would never have described 
them as such—De-Nur presents a story to his larger community in the hope that it will be 
acknowledged, read, and integrated into the wider narrative of that community so that his 
family will not be forgotten. It is perhaps because they are narrative in form—and thus 
pliable to the subjective faculties of the imagination—that the author could glean 
meaning from them that might work his trauma into the greater narrative of his life and 
culture, after it has been blasted apart by trauma and separation. As such, the Salamandra 
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sextet can be argued to constitute another form of historical knowledge, despite their 
fictionality, in the way that they reflect the grieving process of one survivor as he 
attempts to cohere a bifurcated self into a unified present tense. 
 For many survivors of the Holocaust, the impulse to bear witness was intense and 
immediate. Though notably few accounts were published in Hebrew, as has been noted, 
many were published in Yiddish, French, English, and Italian. When so many people had 
been oppressed both physically and emotionally in the camps, the prospect of telling 
one’s story earnestly to credulous listeners may have presented a first step toward 
healing. Susan Brison, a philosopher and trauma theorist, has written extensively about 
the long-term effects of trauma and near-death experiences (and about survivors of rape 
in particular), but her methodology is useful in a discussion of trauma generally. Brison 
argues that the license of survivors to mentally reconstruct their past traumas is crucial to 
“making them [the memories] less intrusive and giving them the kind of meaning that 
enables them to be integrated into the rest of life” (Brison 54). By claiming agency over 
one’s traumas by deliberately remembering them, delivering them narratively and 
controlling the way in which the memories are mediated, one may gain back some of the 
trust they lost in the world when they experienced the trauma by reclaiming subjective 
agency. As Brison notes: “When trauma is of human origin and is intentionally 
inflicted… it not only shatters one’s fundamental assumptions about the world and one’s 
safety in it, but it also severs the sustaining connection between the self and the rest of 
humanity” (Brison 40). At its best, telling one’s story and seeing it received by other 
people may regain some of that prior trust and inner stability, as well as mend some inner 
rift between the pre- and post-trauma self by creating meaning. In this way, narrativizing 
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trauma can serve a personal function for the survivor. As we’ll see later on, the delivery 
of one’s lived trauma in the form of legal testimony may take on both political and 
personal dimensions—particularly in the case of Ka-Tzetnik 135633, in his appearance at 
the Eichmann Trial of 1961 in Jerusalem.  
 In order to demonstrate the urgency of the documentary impulse, quotes from a 
few survivors in relation to their narrative experience of memory seem pertinent. Each 
one seems to crystallize a different aspect of this impulse and, as such, warrant our 
attention. In his preface to Survival in Auschwitz, Primo Levi describes the need as he felt 
it in the camps and afterward: 
I recognize, and ask indulgence for, the structural defects of the book. Its origins 
go back, not indeed in practice, but as an idea, an intention, to the days of the 
Lager. The need to tell our story to ‘the rest’, to make ‘the rest’ participate in it, 
had taken on, for us, before our liberation and after, the character of an immediate 
and violent impulse, to the point of competing with our other elementary needs. 
The book has been written to satisfy this need: first and foremost, as an interior 
liberation. (Levi 9) 
 
By his invocation of “the rest,” it is not clear if Levi means to imply other Jews who were 
not affected by the Sho’ah or if he means the rest of the world generally, and perhaps 
Europe in particular. What is clear, however, is that Levi’s description conjures a certain 
barrier of experience between “the rest” and those he speaks for when he says “our” that 
may be bridged by the reciprocal processes of shared narrative. By speaking in the first 
person plural, Levi seems to imply the communal need to speak as individuals in the face 
of a depersonalizing environment. The conditions of this environment include the 
dismissal of basic human needs such as nutrition and hygiene, so it is interesting that Levi 
ranks the need for testimony among these primal functions and that the ultimate aim of 
this function is “as an interior liberation” in the sense that Brison denotes. By delivering 
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one’s personal story to willing recipients, one may be delivered from trauma by finding a 
new place in a world that had before denied their personal identities and histories, as well 
as their reality as human beings. 
 This sense of advocating a level of humanity that has been oppressively denied 
appears in many survivor testimonies. Taduesz Borowski, a Pole who was incarcerated in 
Auschwitz, describes this denial as a “mockery” of basic human rights that, in so doing, 
warps the ennobled position of man into a justifiable slavery that plans the erasure of 
these slaves from public knowledge once they have served their purpose. It is against this 
possibility that Borwoski, remembering a time prior to the liberation when it was unclear 
as to who would win the war, proposes testimony as an important opposition: 
Work, during which you are not allowed to speak up, to sit down, to rest, 
is a mockery. And every half empty shovelful of earth that we toss on to the 
embankment is a mockery. 
Look carefully at everything around you, and conserve your strength. For 
a day may come when it will be up to us to give an account of the fraud and 
mockery to the living—to speak up for the dead. (Borowski 116) 
 
Here, Borowski clearly cites an inability to exercise free will as a part of this “mockery,” 
but seems also to indicate that forced participation in this dehumanizing scheme (i.e. the 
shovelfuls of earth likely representative of the covering of mass graves) stands as a 
further transgression against the will of man. In this quote as well as Levi’s, one sees 
Borowski compelled toward a communalized point of view. The use of the word “you” 
may have been a silent reminder to the narrator himself, but may also have referred to the 
prisoners generally. Finally, when Borwoski cites the possibility “to speak up for the 
dead, ” the narrator extends the position of the witness outside the scope of the immediate 
trauma, and places it within the larger narratives of history. By advocating for the dead, 
upon whose backs these labor projects were completed, the narrator combats the idea that 
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the official history of this event will also contain the same degree of “mockery” and 
dehumanization.  
 The predilection for a pluralized point of view seems rooted in the restorative 
powers of narrative, as mentioned above, but also seems to be rooted in the techniques of 
the Lager system that were designed to erode the subject’s consistent sense of self, with a 
view to keeping these subjects pliable to the shifting tactics of the Reich as it saw fit. 
Such techniques may include, for example: the standardized, striped uniforms, the 
replacement of a subject’s name with a number, the position of guards and officers 
throughout the Lager, the daily ritual of lining up for counting and appraisal during 
Selektions, and the constant threat of violence that could erupt at the least provocation. 
The aggregated psychological effect of these techniques may be part of the reason why so 
many survivors’ testimonies tend toward the collective voice or the first person plural, in 
the sense that Häfltinge were all treated with these techniques that conflated individual 
diversity into a dehumanized position. It is in the face of this collectivization that many 
survivors attempted to preserve their individual selves. Continuing this thread, Robert 
Antelme, a member of the Resistance in occupied France and a survivor of Buchenwald, 
describes the moment when the SS called his name before conferring his number: 
I shall forever be trying to reconstruct that same principle of identity the SS 
sought to establish yesterday in making me reply yes to my name to assure myself 
that it is indeed me who is actually here. But the evidentness of this fact will 
continually slip away, just as it slips away now. (Anteleme 34) 
 
 Here, Anteleme clings to his name as a link to his pre-incarceration self, distinguishing 
himself from the “principle of identity” that sorts him as another number among many. In 
presenting testimony that is written from their own point of view and attributed to their 
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own name, survivors participate in the world outside of the Lager on a public level and, 
thereby, renew their post-incarceration selves as individuals instead of as numbers.   
In the cases of both personal and legal testimony, questions of subjectivity, 
mediation, and responsibility are always at play. Such questions take on particularly high 
stakes in representations of the Holocaust, when the circumstances and experiences 
conveyed may appear outside of the realm of human limits. In the foreword to his 
memoir, The Human Race, Robert Antelme writes simultaneously of the impulse to bear 
witness as well as the seemingly improbability of achieving it:  
…but we had only just returned, with us we brought back our memory of our 
 experience, an experience that was still very much alive, and we felt a frantic 
 desire to describe it such as it had been. As of those first days, however, we saw 
 that it was impossible to bridge the gap we discovered opening up between the 
 words at our disposal and the experience which, in the case of most of us, was still 
 going forward within our bodies… And then, even to us, what we had to tell 
 would start to seem unimaginable. (Antelme 3) 
 
In describing his experience as “still very much alive,” Antelme invokes the incredible 
urgency of the documentary impulse. Then, post-liberation with the ability to narrate, the 
enormity of the trauma recalled engulfs the boundaries of language. Particularly in the 
case of camp survivors—who endured physical depletion to the point where many could 
not speak at all, and who lived among an incredible “confusion of languages” that did not 
always include one’s own—the renewed ability to communicate freely would seem like 
an incredible advancement.20 Nonetheless, by Antelme’s account, attempts to constrain 
such overwhelming experiences to ordered, sequential language causes the memories to 
approach the “unimaginable.” In this sense, the concept of the unimaginable is paired 
with the prognosis of the untellable, and this seems a strict condemnation indeed.  
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 Further in his foreword, however, Antelme goes on to describe the role that the 
imagination can play in the reconstruction of traumatic memories toward the aim of 
bearing witness: 
 This disproportion between the experience we had lived through and the account 
 we were able to give of it would only be confirmed subsequently. We were indeed 
 dealing then with one of those realities which cause one to say that they defy 
 imagining. It became clear henceforth that only through a sifting, that is only 
 through that self-same imagining could there be any attempting to tell something 
 about it. (Antelme 3-4) 
 
Just after describing memories of Buchenwald as “unimaginable,” Antelme refutes this 
dismissal by posing the imagination itself as a tool to assemble and narrativize traumatic 
memories. By deliberately reconstructing the traumatic past in their minds, the witness 
may find the ability to compartmentalize or organize their memories into a less 
overwhelming coherence and, thereby, to present them to the external world in a manner 
in which they will be received, understood, and believed.  
Though debates about the ability of language to represent experiences that seem 
beyond human limits proliferate, including Adorno’s famous dictum about poetry after 
Auschwitz, 21  the fact nonetheless remains that denying a survivor the possibility to 
narrate their own experiences due to the poverty of language stands as a theoretically-
based dismissal of the right of the survivor to bear witness—and, perhaps, thereby to gain 
some of the benefits that narrativizing memory may afford, as Brison has proposed. In his 
work, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, Giorgio Agamben has 
logically refuted the argument that language cannot satisfy the task of bearing witness to 
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the unimaginable: “On the contrary, only if language is not always already 
communication, only if language bears witness to something to which it is impossible to 
bear witness, can a speaking being experience something like a necessity to speak.”22 
Here, Agamben contends that no experience comes linguistically encoded, and so with 
any testimony it is the job of the witness to arrange their experience meaningfully into 
sequential language. If experiences were already language, if testimony came without the 
mediation of the subject’s mind, then there would be no need to speak at all—the 
testimony could testify for itself. Understanding the importance of personal testimony by 
Agamben’s logic, it is possible to understand that the witness is not facing the impossible 
in the act of conveying their experiences, but actually answering the impulse they’d 
already felt to tell their own story in the way that they see fit. In this way, traumatic 
memories are not dormant things untouchable by language, but actually possibilities for 
healing that are animated by language with the intervention of the imagination.  
By Agamben and Antelme’s logic, the relegation of Holocaust experiences to the 
realm of the unimaginable consigns the possibility of meaningful testimony to silence and 
suppression. The loss of such testimonies would be two-fold, entailing not only the denial 
of a survivor’s possible healing through storytelling, but also historical denial in the sense 
that lived experiences of the Holocaust would not spread from the mouths of those who 
experienced them but rather, and perhaps more dangerously, through dominant national 
presses that risk telling a sanctioned, universalized Holocaust narrative. In dismissing the 
personal, the subjective, from publicly recognized discussions of the Holocaust, society 
again imperils what was (and is) really at stake in genocide: individual people. However, 
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the inclusion of personal testimony within official channels accepts the vulnerabilities of 
the individual human mind—including the shortcomings of memory, as well as of 
language, in the presentation of a lived past experience. As has been established, 
however, the subjective imagination plays a crucial role in cogently assembling 
emotionally dispersed memories. 
In the case of Holocaust testimonies and narratives, the notion of the imagination 
is a tricky one to include. For Holocaust deniers, the invocation of the imagination and of 
subjectivity may seem an entrance point for the refutation of witness testimonies. For 
Anti-Zionists in particular, the negationist movement relies on the assertion that witness 
testimonies are fabricated in order to exaggerate the need for a Jewish home in Palestine 
(Eretz Israel).23 On the other hand, the acknowledgement of the imagination’s function in 
the formulation of testimony may facilitate a further examination of the ways in which 
testimony can affect personal and national identities. It is to this end that a discussion of 
Ka-Tzetnik’s Salamandra sextet can serve to further scholarly interpretations of Yehiel 
De-Nur’s personal transformation into a symbolic celebrity survivor in Israel, as well as 
the role of his works as they have been implemented in the formation of Israeli 
nationalism.  
With Ka-Tzetnik’s works, the concept of testimony and the place of the witness 
are particularly pertinent. Throughout his life, De-Nur published only under the name Ka-
Tzetnik 135633; thereby privileging the inmate (KZ) aspect of his himself as his foremost 
identity to the reader’s mind, his former name and life having been deprived of him in 
Auschwitz. Secondly, De-Nur claims accountability not only for his own traumatic 
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narrative, but, far more so, “to record those of other victims who did not survive to speak 
for themselves.”24 In this way, Ka-Tzetnik’s works seem to stand alone in their rejection 
of a personalized author, and in their claim to give testimony for people other than the 
writer—specifically, in the case of the Salamandra books, to bear witness for those who 
endured extreme sexual abuse by the Nazis and ended their lives by their own hands, and 
for those who did not survive the state of the Mussulman. In order to approach such 
incendiary subjects, it may be useful to establish what exactly is meant by the word 
“testimony” as it is understood in relation to its supposed antithesis, “perjury”—or, more 
aptly in this case, fiction.  
This dualism is expertly evoked by Jacques Derrida in his work, Demeure: 
Fiction and Testimony, which examines the relationship between the two outside of a 
simple binary, viewing them instead as inextricable parts of the public speech act. 
Anchored by a discussion of Maurice Blanchot’s short story, “The Instant of My Death,” 
Derrida argues overall that it is not the job of the witness to confirm or share empirical 
knowledge, but to use their specifically personal knowledge “to make truth… where the 
witness alone is capable of dying his own death, testimony always goes hand in hand 
with at least the possibility of fiction, perjury and lie.”25 The concept of “making truth” 
may seem like an oxymoron, but in fact the idea agrees with what has been established 
about the faculty of the imagination to verbalize trauma specifically. Though Derrida 
explores the metonymic relationship between fiction and testimony, he nonetheless 
acknowledges that outright public lies still remain possible. As he indicates, because it is 
the witness alone who has lived their own experience and thus is the only person who can 
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attest to them, the witness retains the ability to knowingly ply their memories to suit their 
own personal aims. The latter here would constitute perjury, which includes the warping 
of personal experiences and memories into a narrative that does not align with the lived 
past. In either case, the conventions of fiction remain in place in the production of 
testimony at least insofar as they serve as a shared structure through which a memory can 
be externally conveyed to and understood by listeners or readers—even, or especially, in 
the conveyance of so-called “unimaginable” experiences that might not be accessible to 
those who did not live them.  
When it comes to Yehiel De-Nur, the question of testimony becomes even 
murkier in two ways: one, that De-Nur continued to write under his pseudonym even 
after his identity had been revealed at the Eichmann Trial, thereby continuing his refusal 
to personally own his testimony to the public eye; second, that his works were not 
categorized as either novel or memoir at the time of publication, and that the author 
claimed that the work was utterly true regardless of how it was categorized.26 In order to 
understand what may be at stake in both of these factors, a further understanding of 
witness accountability within the fiction-testimony dialectic may be a useful starting 
place. Developing his concept of testimony, Derrida goes on to describe the responsibility 
of the witness in offering their experiences to the public: 
And, above all, he would have to be certain of the distinction between a 
 testimony and a fiction of testimony: for example, between a discourse that is put 
 forward seriously, in good faith, under oath, and a text that lies, pretends to tell 
 the truth, or goes so far as to simulate the oath itself, either with a view to 
 producing a literary work, or, further, by confusing the limit between the two in 
 order to dissolve the criteria of responsibility. (Derrida 35-6) 
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Here, Derrida attests to the listener’s or the reader’s right to know whether or not the 
testimony they are receiving should be understood through the frameworks of either lived 
experience or fabricated narrative; the former being “in good faith,” and the second 
feigning “good faith” in order to assure that their story will be earnestly received while 
retaining the possibility, in the case of empirical refutation, of claiming that the story was 
knowingly fictionalized and so the testifier cannot be held accountable for any 
misunderstanding on the reader’s part. With the pseudonymous publication of his first 
book in 1946, Jeremy Popkin claims that Ka-Tzetnik may be viewed as guilty of the latter 
in his “attempt to claim the privileges of both genres [novel or memoir] and to avoid their 
disadvantages at a time when the stakes in the debate about the representation of the 
Holocaust were not yet clear.”27  
 In addition to his use of a pseudonym, another major criticism of Ka-Tzetnik’s 
work as a vehicle for earnest testimony cites the work’s use of the third person, as 
opposed to the first person of conventional memoir.  Derrida notes that the use of the 
third person denotes a work of literature, in the sense that an artistic tool is introduced 
deliberately into the production of the account.28 Others, however, have deviated from 
this stance in claiming that the use of artfulness when crafting testimony can actually 
make its contents more accessible to readers: 
Artistic stylization is designed to diminish, rather than enlarge, the gap between 
the texts and the historical events they attempt to represent. Under the protective 
shield of both a literary persona and a literary textual construction, an unbearable 
truth is more accessible and more easily approached. (Milner 115) 
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Here, Iris Milner attests that De-Nur’s unconventional narration actually enhances the 
author’s mobility in terms of representing different aspects of his experience—in fact, the 
experiences and emotions that may have been among the most painful. By granting the 
imagination further license in the production of testimony, Milner argues, the author is 
actually able to present a closer version of the “truth” by distancing himself from it via a 
narrative device. Jeremy Popkin expands on this point, acknowledging the historical 
newness of Holocaust testimonies in general at the time that the title book of the series, 
Salamandra, was first released: 
His [Ka-Tzetnik’s] strategy for dealing with the experience is quite unusual 
among Holocaust survivors. Ka-Tzetnik was one of the first survivors to cast his 
story as a coherent narrative, and he had to invent his own literary strategy, rather 
than following already established models. At the time when he wrote 
Salamandra, it was not yet clear that the first-person narrative written by a named 
author would emerge as the normative form for the Holocaust story. (Popkin 345) 
 
Combining the Milner’s and Popkin’s arguments, it becomes clear that De-Nur’s use of a 
pseudonym, in conjunction with the processes of the imagination, allowed him to better 
access and represent his own memories and reactions by layering distance between them 
and his present self. In this way, the author’s incarcerated self, denoted by his acronym 
and number, remained the only version of himself that could testify for his experiences in 
the Lager.   
 The relegation of his public self to the world of the depersonalized victims who 
died without their individual identities was not to last forever, and the public 
acknowledgement of his personal identity caused both mental and physical reactions 
from the author. The revelation of the author’s identity came fifteen years after books 
first appeared in Israel, and six years after House of Dolls first appeared in English. 
Notably, this pivotal moment in De-Nur’s personal history was concurrent with a 
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crucially formative event in Israeli history, especially when “the full sessions of which 
were broadcast live on national radio…psycho-revolutionizing [Israeli’s] self-perception” 
by taking a tangible stand against Nazism in an Israeli national court.29  Given this 
context, the transformation of Ka-Tzetnik 135633 into Yehiel De-Nur in the public eye 
may have been bound up with a burgeoning sense of Israeli empowerment against the 
traumas of the past; despite this seeming correlation, De-Nur continued to publish only 
under his pseudonym until his death—indicating, for some, an inability to conquer his 
past.30 By this understanding, De-Nur’s retention of his incarcerated identity at the public 
level, especially in post-Holocaust Israel, “claimed no victory over the death camps,” and 
thus the books came to be seen as having the potential to shore citizens up in the past 
when they needed to be looking toward the future.31 This new understanding of Ka-
Tzetnik and his books had more to do with the Israeli project of nation building and less 
to do with the author personally, and the final chapter of this essay will delve more 
deeply into the position of the Salamandra sextet in relation to the project of Zionism. 
 It is worthwhile, however, to pause briefly in order to develop some of the 
historical context of the Eichmann Trial. Adolf Eichmann, one of the primary architects 
of the system that transported Jews to extermination and labor camps across Europe, was 
tried in Jerusalem under the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, which was 
enacted in 1950 and, previously, had mainly been applied to survivors living in Israel 
who held functionary positions in the camps (more on this topic will be given in the next 
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section).32 Eichmann was captured in Argentina, and brought to Israel where he gave 275 
hours of pre-trial testimony,33 and was personally “on the stand from June 20 to July 24, 
or a total of thirty-three and a half sessions. Almost twice as many sessions, sixty-two out 
of a total of a hundred and twenty-one, were spent on a hundred prosecution witnesses 
who, country after country, told their tales of horrors… from April 24 to June 12.”34 
Under the direction of David Ben-Gurion, the first Prime Minister of Israel, the Trial has 
largely been viewed as an effort to establish the power of the nascent Israeli court system 
and to ideologically reinforce Zionism in the Middle East against the surrounding Arab 
oppositions.35 
 When Ben-Gurion announced Eichmann’s capture and impending Trial, the 
national media immediately engaged with the story and its implications for the people of 
Israel. A newspaper, Ma’ariv, developed the nationalistic dimension of the Trial in an 
article published the day that Ben-Gurion announced Eichmann’s capture: 
…from the mounds of ashes of the burned, from all the anonymous, nameless 
buried, rose the silent cry that shattered Israel: The greatest nations on earth could 
not catch him. The young men of Israel – did. In the battle with the Jewish mind, 
with our strong will to catch him, with the courage of Israeli security men – he 
failed [for all his satanic cunning] … And justice will be done now. Justice 
befitting a country and a Jewish state, millions of whose potential builders and 
soldiers were butchered on Eichmann’s order. (Zertal 96, cited from Ma’ariv 24 
May 1960) 
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It is interesting that this Ma’ariv article describes the “millions” who perished in the 
catastrophe as Israel’s “potential builders and soldiers”—namely, as people who 
belonged in the Zionist state and who could have served it profitably. By framing the 
Eichmann Trial as an Israeli event and issue, Ma’ariv ignores the myriad of countries that 
were affected by the Holocaust and the multi-nationalism of the victims. This national 
position is reflected in the distribution of the witnesses who were selected to testify at the 
Trial: “There appeared one witness each from France, Holland, Denmark, Norway, 
Luxembourg, Italy, Greece and Society Russia; two from Yugoslavia; three each from 
Rumania and Slovakia; and thirteen from Hungary.”36  This is a fairly representative 
sample, nation-wise, but “All but a mere handful of the witness were Israeli citizens,” and 
they were not chosen from the many who applied to testify, but were selected specifically 
by the prosecution.37 Some argue that all of these factors point to the intention of the 
Trial to strengthen international ethos of Israel in relation to its enemies, serving as a 
public fulcrum by which Ben-Gurion could maintain political leverage on the global 
scale.  
As has been mentioned, early Israel began with a marked attempt to distinguish 
the traumas of the past from the emergent Zionist position of heroism and strength, which 
is one of the reasons that the Holocaust was not largely discussed. Due to this reluctance 
to speak about the victims of the past, the testimonies given at the Eichmann Trial 
constituted some of the earliest public acknowledgments of the scope and gravity of the 
Nazi extermination system. Witnesses were selected “from hundreds of hundreds of 
applicants,” based on, as Hannah Arendt has noted, “the predilection of the prosecution 
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for witness of some prominence, many of whom had published books about their 
experiences.”38 Ka-Tzetnik was among the witnesses called upon to testify, and was 
addressed by the judge as “Mr. Dinoor.”39 Even as he publicly stood in the name Yehiel 
De-Nur, the author still insisted on his KZ-self as a communal entity, in conversation 
with those who passed away in Auschwitz. Upon revealing his identity, the courtroom 
discussion proceeded this way: 
In the trial, Dinur was asked by the judge: “Why did you hide behind the pen-
name Ka-Tzetnik?” To which he replied: “It is not a pen-name. I do not see 
myself as an author who writes literature. This is a chronicle from the planet of 
Auschwitz, whose inhabitants had no names, they were neither born nor bore any 
children; they were neither alive nor dead. They breathed according to different 
laws of nature. Every fraction of a minute there revolved on a different time scale. 
They were called Ka-Tzetnik, they were skeletons with numbers.” (Bartov para. 
23) 
 
 De-Nur’s statement tacitly refutes any idea that he is an artist, “an author who writes 
literature.” Instead, he is a “chronicler” who continues to speak for the dead, the 
inhabitants of another planet—for all its cruelty, hatred, and inhumanity—could not 
possibly be earth. After giving less than ten minutes of testimony, most of which goes on 
in this stark and meandering fashion, De-Nur lost consciousness on the witness stand.40  
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De-Nur being taken from the stand by Israeli guards. 
 
Scholars have interpreted De-Nur’s testimony and fainting spell in various ways. In 
recounting the testimony of “a writer, well known on both sides of the Atlantic under the 
name K-Zetnik,”41 Hannah Arendt wrote the following: 
He started off, as he had done at many of his public appearances, with an 
explanation of his adopted name It was not a “pen-name,” he said. “I must carry 
the name as long as the world will not awaken after the crucifying of the nation… 
He continued with a little excursion into astrology: the star “influencing our fate 
in the same way as the star of ashes at Auschwitz is there facing our planet… 
even Mr. Hausner [the lead prosecutor] felt that something had to be done about 
this “testimony,” and, very timidly, very politely, interrupted: “Could I perhaps 
put a few questions to you if you would consent?” Whereupon the presiding judge 
saw his chance as well: “Mr. Dinoor, please, please, listen to Mr. Hausner and to 
me.” In response, the disappointed witness, probably deeply wounded, fainted and 
answered no more questions. (Arendt 224) 
 
To begin with, Arendt’s belief that the author had addressed the question of his identity 
before does not seem right. In none of the other (English) scholarship on Ka-Tzetnik is 
there any mention of a public, named appearance on the author’s part prior to the Trial. 
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Arendt may have mentioned this in order to bolster her point that the prosecution mainly 
appointed “celebrity” witnesses that had already captured national attention and were 
thus easier to mobilize toward nationalistic aims, and this point is well taken, but this 
statement seems unfounded. She then frames his quotes in an obliquely sarcastic 
manner—a reaction which might make sense for a reporter who had been sent to cover a 
Trial of international attention and significance, in which, conceivably, testimony this 
vague and mystifying might be understood to have no place. However, given the wider 
context of De-Nur’s personal history and mental exhaustion on the public stand, his 
instinct to verbalize the imagined, the cosmologies and theologies he has developed in the 
intervening years in order to explain his experiences to himself, may make sense.  
Shoshanah Felman interpreted De-Nur’s inability to continue his testimony quite 
differently than Arendt did, aligning more with the process of the imagination. As 
opposed to Arendt, who appeared to perceive his testimony as marginal and performative, 
Felman saw it as collusive to the author’s tendency toward a communal, universalized 
narration of the Holocaust: 
K-Zetnik faints because he cannot be interpellated at this moment by his legal 
name, Dinoor: the dead still claim him as their witness, as K-Zetnik who belongs 
to them and is still one of them. The court reclaims him as its witness, as Dinoor. 
He cannot bridge the gap between the two names and the two claims. He plunges 
into the abyss between the different planets. On the frontier between the living 
and the dead, between the present and the past, he falls as though he himself were 
a corpse. (Levine 34, citing Felman 149 in The Juridical Unconscious) 
 
Felman’s interpretation points to the collision of the author’s two identities specifically: 
De-Nur indicating his present, named self, and Ka-Tzetnik representing all those who 
perished in Auschwitz and did not live to testify. The attempt to speak as De-Nur, the 
individual, submerged him again in the voices of the past, and he collapsed under the 
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pressure of attempting to reconcile this internal manifestation of “the other planet” with 
the immediate, tangible context of the courtroom.  
 In an interview given for a piece about the Eichmann Trial on 60 Minutes, De-
Nur himself provided another explanation for his behavior. De-Nur was personally 
connected to Eichmann, having been told that he was granted a visa to leave Poland until 
Eichmann entered the room and “tears up the papers”—and, consequently, including De-
Nur on the next deportation to Auschwitz.42 Over time, De-Nur claims that he built up an 
image of Eichmann in his mind that was proportional to his empowered position to send 
anyone to death at a whim—in a sense, dehumanizing Eichmann in his mind in order to 
understand how someone could be so inhuman. Upon taking the stand, De-Nur says, he 
saw Eichmann—this small, frail man sitting behind glass as a defendant—and he was not 
this apotheosized figure with the power of death, but a man just like himself and like all 
the other men present there.43 This, for De-Nur, was the most terrifying realization of all: 
that it was not only Adolf Eichmann who could wield his power so cruelly, but that all 
men, by the fact of their humanity, are capable of depersonalizing others to the degree 
that their destruction seems justified. 
 With all of this at play, the developing understanding of the role of the 
imagination in Ka-Tzetnik’s works is two-fold: on one level, that the imagination allowed 
De-Nur to connect with the “planet Auschwitz” so that he could write about not only his 
own experiences, but also those of the people he lost, thereby functioning as a vehicle for 
his grief; secondly, that so many years of imagining Eichmann and other SS had led him 
to forget their real-life humanity, relegating them only to that realm of the dead, “planet 
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Auschwitz,” whose conditions were not mentally reconcilable with the present world and 
its inhabitants. The lines of these breaks coincide with the bifurcation of the author’s 
identity, and, on all levels, the theme of dehumanization leading into depersonalization is 
incredibly pronounced. For De-Nur, the Eichmann Trial became a confrontation with the 
realities of the past and its players, and, in the end, De-Nur was overwhelmed and could 
not consciously inhabit that space. [could go in to stuff about “Partial Recall”] [This fact 
constitutes another form of historical knowledge—but one that cannot be drawn from a 
timeline or from annals, but from an analysis of the imaginative space as a uniquely 
insightful zone that, for a survivor, can yield the kind of meaning that can allow them to 
integrate their past traumas into their narrative present. In this way, a future is possible by 
acknowledging the path that leads out from the renewal of the subjectivity—where before 
the individual had been desubjectified—and into the possibility of peace on both the 
inner and the interpersonal levels.  
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III. Representations of Sexual Violence 
 
 
 
For the children of survivors and other Israeli readers, the experience of reading 
Ka-Tzetnik 135633 proved to be an appalling look at life in the Lager—comprising, for 
some, their total understanding of what a camp experience was. It is for this reason that 
many of De-Nur’s critics raise the question of his work’s historical and literary merits, 
asking whether or not readers who are historically and culturally removed from the 
events of the Sho’ah can actualize the horrors of the books in their own terms, and 
thereby understand an aspect of camp experience. Such a question is particularly pressing 
as De-Nur’s works often deal with a particularly sensitive aspect of camp life: sexual 
abuse.   
The second and third books of the Salamandra sextet, which ostensibly deal with 
the fates of his younger sister and brother, present the horrifying circumstances of sexual 
slavery within the camps. In House of Dolls, De-Nur’s most widely translated book, the 
young Daniella is taken from the ghetto in a girl’s Aktion to work in a brothel in 
Auschwitz. In Piepel, Moni, a boy of about seven, is separated from his father upon 
entering Auschwitz to serve as piepel to the block guards—that is, to be both maid and 
sex slave to a high-ranking German prisoner in Auschwitz. Though neither work is 
notably explicit in terms of imagery or overtly sexual language, Daniella and Moni’s 
camp experiences are defined by their position as utterly subjugated sex objects that serve 
the whims of German men. As we’ll see later, the historicity of such positions within the 
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camp system is dubious; however, it appears that De-Nur’s emphasis on sexuality 
functions more as a symbol of humiliation and suffering than as a way to express what 
his siblings really went through—which, as neither of them survived the war, he could 
not have known in detail. As has been suggested, De-Nur’s propensity to trust this 
symbol as an expedient means of evoking emotion from the reader may be rooted in 
mental illness and survivor’s guilt.  
As has been addressed, these two books exhibit differing styles of representation, 
which, in their divergence, constitute further evidence of the author’s inability to 
reconcile his own identity with the traumas of the past, and his continued insistence on 
anonymity. As has been mentioned, the publication of the books with the Ka-Tzetnik 
byline offered a universalized (or universalizable) version of Holocaust reality, and the 
inscriptions inside of the English editions of these two works in particular demonstrate 
the intended scope of the events as they are depicted. Piepel contains two inscriptions, 
both of which frame the reader’s reception of the work: 
Piepels… boys whom the Block Chiefs of Auschwitz selected for their sexual 
orgies. The recorder of this account does not know the origin of the name 
‘Piepel’, who coined it, or in what language it originates. Be that as it may, in 
Auschwitz the name was as familiar as the names Bread and Crematorium. (Ka-
tzenik) 
 
K.Z. (German-pronounced Ka-tzet) are the initials of the German term for 
concentration camp. Every K.Z. inmate was ‘Ka-tzetnik Number…’ the personal 
number branded into the flesh of the left arm. The writer of Piepels was Ka-
tzetnik 135633. (Ka-Tzetnik) 
 
Both of these inscriptions—which may or may not have been personally approved by the 
author prior to press—claim immediate historicality for the events depicted, as well as 
credibility for their author as someone who has lived the experience. The section of this 
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essay that concerns the history of sexual violence against males specifically go into 
further detail about the existence of piepels and their role in the camps, but, for now, 
suffice it to say that claiming universally that all camp inmates were aware of piepels is a 
rather grand claim. Notably, this inscription uses the word “account” to describe the 
book, thus framing the work as a non-fictive representation of historical reality. 
Particularly, the use of the word “account,” given that the work is in the first person, 
seems to suggest that the book was written by Moni himself. Given that this is in the 
beginning of the book, the reader may’ve forgotten this paratextual framing by the time 
they reach the end of the book, at the time of Moni’s death. Again, this may have been a 
marketing technique on the part of the publisher. Similar to the way in which Piepel is 
framed, the inscription inside of House of Dolls positions its protagonist as representative 
of a female Lager experience: 
THIS GIRL—   
forced from her home, forced into prostitution for Hitler’s legions, forced 
to watch the deliberate and grotesque annihilation of her loved ones… 
THIS GIRL—   
one alone of the six million who were plunged into the living hells of 
Bunchwald, Dachau, Auschwitz… but through the vivid, terrible narrative 
of her individual torment you will know the story of all who were caught 
up in this holocaust… 
THIS GIRL—   
witness to and unwilling participant in one of the most shameless 
moments of inhumanity that man has ever known… (Ka-Tzetnik) 
 
The inscriptions inside of Piepel and House of Dolls both demonstrate the role that De-
Nur’s pseudonym played in the reader’s reception of the work as presenting a historical 
reality. The inscriptions diverge, however, in the terms by which they self-identify the 
form of the text provided. Piepel is presented as an “account” while House of Dolls, in 
the second part of the inscription, is purported to be an “individual narrative.” As has 
Allen      44
been mentioned, the term “account” implies instant historicality; whereas the word 
“narrative” seems indicative of something much subjective, something utilizing the 
conventions of fiction to render its story legible to readers whether it is historically 
verifiable or not. Again, different companies published these books, but this discrepancy 
seems telling. It is important to note as well that the books are not paratextually 
categorized as being fiction, memoir, or historical nonfiction. Given all of these 
ambiguities, it is useful to launch into an investigation of the historical realities of sexual 
abuse during the period of the Holocaust. This framework will be useful to understand, 
first of all, the general relationship of female sexuality to the continued identities of 
nations, the specific position of Jewish sexuality within the Nazi biopolitcal schematic, 
and, finally, the role of all of the above in the development of Israeli nationalism.  
To begin, sexual violence and the female body play a unique role in warfare and 
cultural continuity, on both symbolic and literal levels. Rape is an unfortunately common 
means of subjugating a conquered population, despite its explicit classification as a war 
crime. As Nomi Levenkron has noted, “Until just a few years ago, rape was considered 
an insignificant byproduct of armed conflicts—traditional soldiers’ wages”.44 In the case 
of war, rape serves not only as a means of physical domination but also of symbolic 
domination. Miryam Sivan illustrates the extent to which this symbolic effect can 
destruct personal and national identities in saying that “rape has come to represent 
literally, figuratively, and allegorically, the depths of an individual’s and a nation’s 
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helplessness.”45 Domestic structures are arranged by human sexuality, accommodating 
reproduction and cooperation in the raising of offspring, so the invasion of the family 
unit, via the female body, is a violation of the home in a way that combat isn’t. 
Culturally, the female body is held as a site that must be protected, and in the case of 
invasion it is one of the first sites to be dominated. Such an act shames the men of the 
invaded population, and putrefies the possible dignity of defeat into deep humiliation. 
Levnekron continues, “Perhaps more than any other wartime trauma, rape is perceived as 
the scene of the violent encounter between the personal trauma and the collective 
trauma”.46 In this way, rape is not only a tactic of undocumented war on the front, but 
also a symbolic fracturing of what makes the home, and thus the population, whole.  
In Nazi ideology, sexuality holds a unique position as a biopolitical issue. Though 
Nazism originates as an answer to economic struggles, one of its central ideals became 
the purification of the German population in pursuit of an Aryan state. This included the 
eradication of what had been deemed to be corruptive genetic components within the 
German citizenry that included the mentally ill, homosexuals, and the Jewish population. 
In this way, the unified German nation was regarded as a kind of biological body in itself, 
containing certain bacteria that endangered the health of that body. In his book, Bíos: 
Biopolitics and Philosophy, Roberto Esposito points out the degree to which the 
metaphor of the purification of the body saturated German politics: “[Nazism] demanded 
that politics be identified directly with biology in a completely new form of biocracy”.47  
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 Toward this aim, Fritz Lens, a geneticist and member of the Nazi Party, 
developed a manual titled Rassenhygiene (racial hygiene) that outlined the separation of 
the population in biological terms, and dubbed Hitler “the great German doctor” who was 
to cure the Aryan nation of any biological impurities.48  Beginning with concerns of 
miscegenation and separation, as encoded in the Nuremberg Laws, this extreme form of 
biopower eventually categorized certain populations as degenerate and, as a result, 
justifiable for extermination in the interest of the health of the greater whole: “To say that 
the degenerate is abnormal means pushing him toward a zone of indistinction that isn’t 
completely included in the category of the human”.49  Giorgio Agamben echoes this 
notion as well, stating how the dehumanization of the populace in favor of an abstracted, 
biologically separable whole allowed for a Nazi biopolitic so absolute that it coincided 
with thanatopolitics—the politicization of death itself.50 Evidence of this extremity can be 
found in the word “hygiene” as it is used in Lenz’s Rassenhygiene manual, and into the 
use of “showers” as a pretense for sites using Cyclon B. The very arrangement of 
systemic extermination implemented by the Nazis is rooted in the ideology of purity, and 
the metaphor of unified Germany as a purging body extends across this ideology.  
 Ending in a policy of generalized extermination, the role of genetics in Nazism 
began at the site of the home, and, more specifically, the site of fertile female body. With 
the home as the constitutive unit of the nation and the woman as the bearer of future 
generations, invasions of the individual body advanced Nazi control of Germany’s 
genetic makeup. In attempting to separate from and eventually rid the German body of 
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any non-Aryan impurities, measures were taken to ensure that the further procreation of 
these undesirables within Germany’s borders could not take place. Such measures took 
the form of forced sterilizations and abortions, which began with the passage of the 
Gesetz zur Verhüng erbkranken Nachwuchses (Law for the Prevention of Genetically 
Diseased Offspring) in 1933—a law that concerned people with disabilities that could be 
genetically inherited.51 Further, Ellen Ben-Sefer notes, “Forced sterilization laws soon 
applied to couples if one of the partners was an ‘Aryan’ German and the other was Jewish 
or a Mischling (half-Jewish)”—this at the same time that Himmler promoted the 
Lebensborn program of “pure blood” selective couplings among Aryans. 52   To 
demonstrate the scope of these policies, approximately 350,000 people were sterilized 
during World War II—including the sterilization of between 385 and 500 children “based 
solely on racial background”.53  
Policy was also developed in regards to Rassenschande (race defilement), which 
was considered one of the most treasonous crimes that a German man could commit. It is 
clear sexual encounters with Jewish women were never approved of by the Nazi 
administration or, especially, institutionalized in the camps as it is dramatized in Ka-
Tzetnik’s House of Dolls.54 However, the issue of sexual assault in the form of rape is not 
entirely excluded from the history of this time period. Many German men deviated from 
official Party ideologies in their individual actions. As Hannah Arendt has pointed out, 
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“Nazi officials… prided themselves on belonging to a movement, as a distinguished from 
a party, and a movement could not be bound by a program”.55 Given this sort of attitude, 
it is conceivable that the imposition of the sexual will onto the subjugated person was one 
clear way to deliver the message of that movement in terms of interpersonal 
domination—even if the Party did not sanction those forms of violence. Helene J. 
Sinnreich calls this phenomenon “center-periphery relations,” wherein Nazi-empowered 
German men may have acted counter to administrative ideologies while out of the sight 
of their superiors. Some men on the periphery may have chosen to exacerbate their 
already violent actions, presuming they would go unnoticed, while, on the other side of 
the spectrum, others chose to aid or even hide Jews themselves—a nearly equal crime. 
Though some of these instances may have been reported back to Berlin, “we can only 
uncover departures from Nazi orthodoxy only through victim testimony,” and, as is all 
too common in any instance of sexual abuse, many women were wary of coming forward 
with their experiences.56  
In House of Dolls, Daniella—the younger sister of De-Nur’s literary persona, 
Harry Preleshnik—is taken to work in the “Joy Division” of a labor camp, where she is 
forced into sexual situations with the German troops who pass through the area. The 
German word Feld-Hure, or field whore, is tattooed between her breasts, along with her 
serial number. If the soldier feels that the girl’s performance is nonchalant, stiff, or in any 
way unsatisfactory he only has to report her number to the Master Kalefactress (block 
guard) for punishment. In this way, the girls not only have to physically receive the 
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power that is wielded over them, but to express it with the outward appearance of 
pleasure. This measure of control, which forces both victim and perpetrator to participate 
actively in the exchange of power, is ultimately dehumanizing for Daniella, on top of the 
other trying aspects of life in the camp, and she ends up feigning an escape attempt so 
that the camp’s border sentries open fire on her.  
For Daniella, the question of sexual abuse does not begin with incarceration in the 
camp, but in the ghetto beforehand. Fella, another girl with whom Daniella had been 
hiding in the ghetto, makes the following remarks about the difference between their 
sexual enslavement in the camp and their previous vulnerability in the ghetto: 
“They’ve stamped us to show that we belong to the German government. From 
now on no one is allowed to touch us. We’ll work for the Germans, and in 
exchange they’ll feed us. From now on, till the end of the war, we’re the property 
of the German government. Anyway, we’ll have somebody looking after us. Not 
like in the ghetto where we were public property, and anyone who could handle a 
smattering of German could do as he liked with us.” (Ka-Tzetnik, House of Dolls 
127) 
 
As has been shown, Jewish women were likely subject to sexual abuse by Nazi 
aggressors on the front, but these women were also vulnerable to assault from people in 
the ghettoes who protected them, hid them, or otherwise engaged with them. As Zoë 
Waxman has observed, many more women went into hiding or attempted to pass as 
Aryans in order to avoid deportation due to the fact that Jewish men were easier for Nazi 
officers to find. This was largely due to the fact that most German men of the time had 
been drafted into war, and so any men out of uniform were conspicuous on the streets; 
secondly, German men were not circumcised, and so any man who was suspected of 
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being Jewish was ordered to expose himself for verification. 57  Women thus had a 
generally easier time of blending in, under the guise of forged papers or protective (and 
often dangerous) friendships with Nazi women or merchants. Under these circumstances, 
many women—either in attempting to pass as Aryans or in hiding—engaged in sexual 
relations to assure their own safety. Testimonies have been given on both ends of the 
spectrum, some describing instances of molestation by their protectors while in hiding, 
and others who experienced the coerced exchange of sexual favors for food, 
documentation, or other needs.58 The unfortunate reality is that whenever people are 
forced to go underground in order to survive, there are always people waiting to take 
advantage of them. Citing Marion Kaplan, Zoë Waxman describes a specific incident of 
sexual abuse in hiding: 
Kaplan also points to other perils of going into hiding in Germany: “Some young 
women even resorted to exchanging sex for shelter, including working in brothels 
in Berlin.” But she also notes a Rassenschande (race defilement) court case 
involving Jewish women in hiding and reports that the women convicted of 
exchanging sex for shelter were then murdered. (Waxman 126) 
 
It is known that some women who passed as Aryans on the public level worked in 
brothels that served German men, and, further, that some women in hiding (voluntarily or 
involuntarily) engaged in sexual intercourse that crossed the racial boundaries prescribed 
in the Nuremberg Laws, and were consequently removed from the German biopolitical 
body under the banner of genetic purification and racial hygiene.  
Though Daniella’s experience in the Joy Division (referred to by inmates as the 
“Doll House”) is vividly rendered, many historians have proved that Jewish women never 
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experienced the kind of Party-sanctioned servitude that Daniella does in House of Dolls. 
The Nazis, however, kept excellent records of program-approved violence against other 
people who were deemed unfit for the purified Reich, and much is known about the 
implementation of camp brothels in this context. These Sonderbauten (or “special 
buildings,” an SS euphemism for brothels) first began to appear in July 1942, with the 
first one opening at Mauthausen in annexed Austria. The idea came from Heimlich 
Himmler, who, upon visiting the nearby quarry where prisoners extracted granite for 
Hitler’s plans to redesign many major German cities, “did not want to accept that the 
efficiency of camp prisoners was only 50 percent compared to civilian workers”. 59 
Though it seems obvious that this decreased productivity was due to malnutrition and 
poor hygiene, Himmler believed that it was sexual frustration that stalled the pace of 
work: “In his opinion, denying the necessity to ‘provide’ women to satisfy sexual needs 
of male camp prisoners would be welt-und lebensfremd (out of touch with the world and 
life)”.60  
By the end of the Third Reich, brothels had been opened in ten of the major 
concentration camps, including Auschwitz-Monowitz, despite the ineffectiveness of 
brothel visitations as an incentive for camp workers. From Nazi records and witness 
testimonies, Robert Sommer has reconstructed the nationalities of these forced sex 
workers: out of about 210 total female inmates, 114 were German (“88 were registered as 
asocial prisoners, nine as political prisoners, and four as criminals”), forty-six women 
were Polish, three were either Polish or German, fourteen were of Slavic origin, and one 
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was Dutch. Eleven of these women “can be identified as prisoner guards and accountants 
for the brothels”. 61  Interestingly, the records indicate that sixty-six percent of these 
women were placed in the brothels as punishment for asocial behavior, while brothel 
visitation was provided to privileged male inmates as a reward for work. Women were 
forced to make their bodies available in order to increase male productivity in the camps, 
and, as a result, both men and women were humiliated under the demeaning constraints 
of Nazi authority. Compared to the total number of Jews who suffered atrocities at the 
hands of the Nazis, statistics like these may seem pithy, but one may argue that the 
suffering of even one person is one too many and that each individual’s story belongs to 
the greater narratives of history. Including questions of gender and sexuality in 
discussions about this period brings these stories forward, thus preserving an aspect of the 
Holocaust that is often overlooked in scholarship.  
As has been noted, De-Nur wrote these books as a way to mourn the family he 
lost during the Holocaust, and, given this perspective, it seems that the author intends 
House of Dolls to be not only a kind of monument but also to demonstrate his own 
sorrow and anger regarding the loss of his sister. Due to the time period at which these 
works were published, however, the books had a wider impact than on just De-Nur 
himself. For the children of survivors whose parents were reticent about their 
experiences, the liberation of the camps was followed by a pervasive culture of silence in 
which many of the children did not know what their parents had been through.62 As a 
result, the experience of reading Ka-Tzetnik, for many, constituted a first glimpse into the 
horrors their parents endured. This glimpse, which was not published as either fiction or 
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nonfiction, proved a shocking and explosive look at life in the camps for many reasons. 
De-Nur’s works are sparsely written, unadorned, and often blunt about emotionally 
delicate circumstances. It is for this reason that many of Ka-Tzetnik’s critics ask the 
question of whether or not readers who are historically and culturally distanced from the 
events of the Holocaust can appropriate the horrors of the book in their own terms—in 
other words to imagine them significantly and personally, but also as accurately as 
possible. As Ka-Tzetnik’s work deals so heavily in sexual themes—particularly, the 
dramatization of sexual violence in circumstances in which, historically, it did not 
occur—such a question is particularly pertinent. 
Galia Glasner-Heled conducted a study in which she interviewed several readers 
of De-Nur’s work and took a narrative approach to understanding how these people 
integrated the content of De-Nur’s books into their understanding of the Holocaust in 
general. As she notes, “[Ka-Tzetnik] had a strong personal impact on the members of the 
generation of Israelis who were teenagers in the 1950s and 1960s, and many of [the 
interview participants] remember his book as their first and most devastating encounter 
with the Holocaust”.63 Her research was particularly relevant as, at this time in 1994, the 
Israeli Ministry of Education was considering reissuing the books for distribution in 
public schools and many scholars, as well as interview participants, greatly opposed the 
measure. One participant, Malka Tor, describes her feelings this way: 
There is something very callous, something very crude, uh, unpitying, isn’t there? 
It’s as though he’s saying ‘This reality is so…pitiless that I’m not going to spare 
you anything. I will give you the naked facts.’ And when this is your first actual 
encounter with the Holocaust, there’s something terribly traumatizing about it, 
isn’t there? Something very… very, very penetrating. Very profound… you’re 
reading about real events It’s really touching the truth… the bleeding flesh. (116) 
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Tor felt that Ka-Tzetnik’s works conveyed historical reality, and, significantly, the lack 
of artfulness and skill exhibited by the writer enhanced the verisimilitude of the books. 
They were obviously not art, so they had to be something else, and, for many, that 
artlessness signified reality. Dorit Sharir, a coordinator for the project to distribute Ka-
Tzetnik’s books, echoes Tor’s feelings: “With Ka-Tzetnik—it is without embellishment, 
no restraint, the whole story of what happened”.64 Furthermore, as Heled notes, “The 
phrase ‘without embellishment’ recurs in all these interviews”—implying that the 
artlessness of the text was invoked by every participant, regardless of their position on 
the Ministry’s initiative or the books themselves.65  
In terms of Ka-Tzetniks works as a means of accessing the historical reality of the 
Holocaust, Tor’s and Sharir’s position is certainly not the only one that appears in the 
interviews as well as the scholarship generally. One of the interviewees, Porat, said the 
following when asked whether or not she believed that Ka-Tzetnik’s books 
“misrepresent” the Holocaust: 
No. Piepels happened and a houses of dolls happened [sic]. There’s no doubt 
about that… He made the subject inaccessible because of the overdose… There is 
something dark in his books, something about dark and human evil. Dreadful 
things that happened to people, and perhaps they don’t tell us everything, he 
certainly doesn’t say everything. I don’t think he helped create a breakthrough in 
the public’s consciousness of the Holocaust. He blocked consciousness… When 
you read his stories, you might, indirectly, develop a negative attitude towards the 
survivors. Because if these people were saved, and this what they went through, 
and they were saved, then who exactly are these people? (Glasner-Heled 125) 
 
Here, Porat acknowledges the historic reality of sexual abuse during the Holocaust—
though, as has been shown, the sanctioned brothels did not include Jewish women, as is 
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portrayed in House of Dolls—but still argues that his books deny the reader a viable inlet 
to the everyday life of the camps. In Porat’s view, Ka-Tzetnik’s books are still capable of 
delivering a historical rendition of the events of the Holocaust, but the events themselves 
are too horrifying to look at head-on, and so must be mediated by more traditional literary 
techniques or possibly retrospective reflection in order to be realistically digested by a 
modern reader—in other words, the events must refract through a lens that might give the 
events some kind of meaning. Here, the brutally literal and artless way that Ka-Tzetnik 
renders Auschwitz yields a reader who does not want to imagine something so terrifying, 
as opposed to the way that other authors have written about camp life in more artful ways 
that may be more inviting to a reader. In House of Dolls, the humiliation and shame that 
Daniella suffers due to sexual and emotional violence is heartbreaking to read. For some, 
it seems that the horrors she suffers, amplified by the bluntness of their rendering, bar the 
reader from accessing the version of Holocaust reality that De-Nur is trying to present. 
From this point of view, Ka-Tzetnik’s sextet is an ineffective beginning to a frank 
conversation about the Holocaust and its implications in Israel; instead, it is a gratuitous 
and violating experience for the reader.  
The same notion is brought up in Tor’s account of reading Ka-Tzetnik, wherein 
she mentions that the reader feels “penetrated” while reading. Citing the writer Haim 
Be’er, Heled evokes the feeling of violation that many readers endure: “You mustn’t 
overwhelm someone. What this is, to put it as vulgarly as possible, is the feeling of being 
raped… It’s as though he [Ka-Tzetnik] is throwing you [into the Holocaust]. They [other 
writers] take me into hell”.66 In his statement, Be’er goes on to make the distinction that 
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other writers on the Holocaust lead the reader gently through the horrors they depict, 
easing them in, whereas Ka-Tzetnik throws people into that historical reality 
unapologetically. Furthermore, in saying that reading the books causes “the feeling of 
being raped”, Be’er equates the experience of reading about rape with the experience of 
rape itself—at the emotional or mental level. Miryam Sivan, a Holocaust historian, 
countered this argument in saying that “those who read Ka-Tzetnik’s works as 
voyeuristic… or who feel sexual arousal and not moral outrage, or feel themselves raped, 
trivializing the victim’s pain, do so… not because of any inherent content or quality of 
the text”. 67  In Sivan’s view, Be’er’s belief that the books are inconsiderate of the 
reader—causing shame, humiliation, and vulnerability to the degree that a person who’s 
been raped might’ve experienced—is ultimately dismissive and trivializes the experience 
of those who actually have endured sexual abuse. Given how often the metaphor of 
violation and penetration came up in the interviews, however, one still wonders about the 
impact of the books in delivering an emotionally devastating picture of camp life that, for 
many, was representative of the emotional gravity that was experienced by those who 
were really in the camps. 
 In addition to holding the reader at arm’s length from the horrors they depict, 
Porat’s statement indicates another possible consequence of the books. By including 
sexual abuse in his rendition of concentrationary reality, Ka-Tzetnik introduced the idea 
that many survivors endured not only hunger, verbal degradation, and unthinkable work 
conditions, but also the additional torture of forced sex labor. Whenever the issue of 
sexuality comes into play, cross-culturally, it seems that the question of shame and 
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complicity is never very far behind. In post-war Israel, many Holocaust survivors had a 
difficult time integrating with existent society there, so the added possibility of sexual 
deviance added a new dimension of stigmatism to an already complex social space. Nomi 
Levenkron describes the tepid reception of abused women back into Jewish communities 
wherein “modesty was women’s principal or even their only admission ticket into the 
collective… Sexuality defined the boundaries of the collective and therefore held within 
it the danger of this boundary being breached”.68 Levenkron’s understanding of the way 
that sexuality defines the collective synchronizes with what has been established about 
the way domestic structures are arranged in peacetime, and how wartime rape is an effort 
to break up society at the level of the family unit. Speaking to the other side of this, 
Levenkron evokes the way that victims of wartime rape were often seen as somehow 
complicit with the enemy, having broken that crucial cultural boundary, and thus had to 
suffer disgrace as well as, for many, “severe emotional traumas, unwanted pregnancies, 
and venereal diseases”.69 Such were the social and physical ramifications for women who 
came forth with their experiences or whose experiences had become public knowledge 
under other circumstances; certainly, many more women did not speak out and their 
stories are lost to time.  
 By adding a sexual dimension to a conversation about the Holocaust that was still 
in its beginning stages, Ka-Tzetnik’s books were in danger of casting all survivors into 
this kind of stigmatized position (as well as, some argue, sensationalizing the issue of 
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sexual abuse among the youth of the Yishuv).70 As Holocaust survivors were migrating to 
Israel and mixing the Jewish population in Palestine, the Yishuv, the question of how to 
form a new national identity was also in balance with the volatile understanding (and 
misunderstanding) of everything that occurred within the ghettoes and the camps just a 
few years earlier. Heled qualifies Porat’s attestation that Ka-Tzetnik’s books present a 
“negative image of the survivor” as in conversation with Israel’s burgeoning nationalism, 
as well as with the rights of the individual to harbor their own stories: “Porat suggests 
that we do not need to understand and know everything that had happened in the 
Holocaust… She thinks that the privacy of the survivor should be respected and 
protected, but there is also the question of protecting the self and the society, which is 
shaped by memory”.71 By this understanding, it is not only the survivor’s right to keep 
their stories to themselves if they wish, but possibly also in the interest of the collective 
to do so. At this pivotal point in Jewish culture, the people have the power to decide how 
they wish to proceed, reorganize, and form themselves both socially and individually. By 
deciding to leave certain destructive parts of their history out of collective memory, a 
more cohesive and forward-thinking society might be possible—one that was not still 
contending with the ineffable horrors of the past every day. Such an approach, however, 
silences not only Ka-Tzetnik but other survivors whose story may be suppressed by this 
approach to forming a collective Israeli memory of the Holocaust. One interviewee, the 
daughter of a survivor, said:  
…and when I reached high school and first encountered Ka-Tzetnik, I knew that 
my mother… I just realized that my mother was survivor. It was unmistakable… 
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His story was a tremendous catalyst, to start asking my mother more questions. 
(Glasner-Heled 115) 
 
In this statement, the daughter makes no claim as to the historicity of Ka-Tztetnik’s 
works, but insists upon their importance in opening a conversation between her and her 
mother that, ostensibly, was a nourishing and healing process for both parties. To deny 
survivors—whether they be survivors of sexual abuse or not—the possibility of giving 
testimony seems an extension of the violence that was wrought in the first place, and 
entails the further destruction of the victim’s sense of self, as person with a speakable 
history that others can hear, accept, and frankly acknowledge.  
Though discussions of gender and sexuality have largely been excluded from 
scholarly analysis of the Holocaust until recently,72 Ka-Tzetnik’s books House of Dolls 
and Piepel seem to insist that sexual abuse remain integral to the study of this period—
especially given that his was one of the first widely read survivor narratives. Though it 
seems unlikely that he knew nearly as much as we know now about the extent of sexual 
violence during the Holocaust, even given what he may have been told while in a 
Displaced Persons Camp post-liberation, De-Nur nonetheless attempts to represent the 
possible consequences of those situations for Jews at this time. Whether or not Jews 
experienced sexual enslavement the way that Ka-Tzetnik portrays it in these books is 
highly contested, crystallized perhaps by two divergent viewpoints. Miryam Sivan, who 
seems to believe that the stories are true, advocates De-Nur’s social responsibility in 
voicing the repressed stories of the Holocaust: “Only because his siblings suffered this 
abuse, not Ka-Tzetnik himself, could he write about it. Shame and social censorship did 
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not stifle him.”73 Omer Bartov, on the other hand, contends that Ka-Tzetnik’s books (as 
well as his ambiguous persona) were deliberately engineered to acquire singular celebrity 
for their author, and, toward this aim, capitalized on this transitionary period in Jewish 
history: “The excitement evoked in young readers by such pulp fiction stemmed both 
from the encounter with forms of human activity kept tightly sealed from them by the 
puritanical nature of pre-1967 Israeli society, and from the fact that the central site for 
these actions was the concentration camps”.74 As for the author himself, he continued to 
vouch for the veracity of the works as corroborative with historical reality in his 
insistence that he spoke for the victims of Auschwitz, for those who did not live to testify 
for themselves. Whatever the motivation for writing these books, the disparate reactions 
listed here indicate that much has been written in response to these books—in particular, 
in response to their reception in the state of Israel at a politically formative time in its 
history.  
The attempt to implement the books on a governmental level by including them in 
nationalized curricula seems at odds with much of the public and scholarly opinions that 
have been previously discussed, and the result forms a shifting picture of Israeli attempts 
to arrange a society that is both future-minded and rooted in the traumas of the past. Early 
conceptions of Holocaust survivors, the process of the Eichmann Trial, and the unique 
position of Ka-Tzetnik’s books in Israeli culture all point toward the way that 
anonymized testimonies—that is, testimonies which are lumped invariably together—can 
be politically wielded in such a way as to result in further violence.  
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The survivors who testified at the Eichmann Trial—deliberately selected though 
they may have been—constituted some of Israel’s most concrete firsthand conceptions of 
the Holocaust. As has been previously discussed, De-Nur’s books are largely understood 
to have broken the silence surrounding the issue in 1946, with both internal (on the part 
of the author) and external (on the part of the nation) implications. By spurring public 
conversation about the Holocaust, the books left an indelible impression on the minds of 
young Israelis at a politically and socially formative time for the state of Israel. Thus, the 
Ministry of Education’s initiative to teach Ka-Tzetnik’s books in the 1990s can be 
understood as an intergenerational transmission of Holocaust narratives that, given the 
institutional context, seem to be mobilized toward maintaining a consistent understanding 
of the books—and, thereby, the events they represent—through time, in pursuit of social 
hegemony. Glasner-Heled understands the initiative this way:  
Some Israelis who grew up in the 1950s may expect [Ka-Tzetnik] to play a 
similar role in the life of the younger generation, a generation that knows too 
much and whose attitude towards the Holocaust is rational and increasingly 
processed, becoming distanced from the original experience. (Glasner-Heled 120) 
 
By this line of thinking, Ka-Tzetnik’s books seem to have been reinstated in public 
understanding for the very reason that they are explicit, haunting, and appropriately brutal 
in their descriptions of the Lager. In trusting that the next generation will react as strongly 
as the previous generation did to the version of historical reality presented in Salamandra 
and House of Dolls, the Ministry apparently believed that the books would shock into 
action “a society that seems to be rather ‘accustomed’ to the Holocaust today.”75 The goal 
seems to entail the promotion of Zionism: that is, to teach Ka-Tzetnik’s books in order to 
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intensify the youth’s reactions to the Holocaust, so as to reinforce its intended lessons of 
protection, reactiveness, heroism, and anti-victimhood. 
As has been well established, Ka-Tzetnik’s books are not exactly congruous with 
historical reality as we now know it. Modern students, the Israeli students to whom his 
books would be distributed in school, now have a wealth of information with which to 
attempt to conceptualize the horrors of the Holocaust; such resources are antithetical to 
those available to the first generation of children following the survivors. Another one of 
Glasner-Heled’s interviewees said, “You can’t compare their knowledge of the Holocaust 
to what I knew about the Holocaust, can you?”76 Some argue that the equation of the 
world represented in the sextet Salamandra: The Chronicle of a Jewish Family in the 
Twentieth Century with historical reality had serious consequences for the already 
tenuous social position of survivors in Israel. Dramatizing the extremity of the Lager 
experience and the perceived immorality with which some people managed to survive—
while most did not—further destabilized the social position of many survivors who were 
already marginalized from the people of the Yishuv by national, linguistic, and cultural 
boundaries. These social prejudices were coincident with the aggrandizement of the 
anonymous dead, wherein the approximated six million victims were legally granted 
Israeli citizenship en masse.77 This symbolic gesture made toward the dead, running 
counter to the non-assimilation with which the living were greeted, further presents the 
notion of depersonalization as a tool by which the events of the past are emplotted in 
national narratives. Successive generations in Israel now, clearly, have much more 
information and testimonial material by which to attempt to understand the period of the 
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Sho’ah for themselves, but the Ministry’s decision to circulate the books in official 
curricula constitutes an effort to repeat the ignorance of the past in favor of emotional 
reactionism.  
Among the goals of financial and defensive security, another was the promotion 
of the social bond among Israeli citizens in opposition to their enemies. Zertal further 
argues that many laws established in the 1950s and early ‘60s—such as the Nazi and 
Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law (1950) and the Holocaust and Heroism 
Remembrance Law (1953), among others—were designed “to fuse the mass of 
immigrants from more than a hundred countries into a national collective, driving a 
common memory and sharing a single vision of the present and future.” 78  This is 
certainly no small project, and the scope and emotional gravity of the Holocaust was well 
suited to the elicitation of social bonds between survivors, Zionists, and Sabras alike—a 
level of coherence that, significantly, could be legally and governmentally directed. 
Zertal posits that the aim here was to condition the population into militaristic obedience 
and loyalty—essentially, to prepare young Israelis for the glory of self-sacrifice.79  
This agenda was explicitly realized in a 1994 reissue of House of Dolls, a special 
edition sponsored by the Israeli Ministry of Education. This special edition volume 
included an addendum written “by Yitsak Sadeh (commander of the pre-state defense 
organization, the Haganah) published originally in 1946.” 80  Sadeh’s essay was 
accompanied by what was purported to be “’an authentic photograph of Paela, heroine of 
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the book Bet ha-bubot’ portraying a woman whose bare chest carries the tattoo: FELD-
HURE.”81 Bartov provides an excerpt of Sadeh’s essay: 
Night. On the wet sand my sister stands before me: filthy, her clothes in 
disarray, her hair disheveled, barefoot, her head bowed – she stands and weeps. 
I know: Her flesh is stamped with the tattoo: “for officers only.” 
And my sister weeps and says: 
Comrade, why am I here? Why was I brought here? Am I worthy of the 
young and healthy lads who risk their lives for me? No, I have no place in the 
world. I should not go on living. 
I hug my sister… and say to her: You have a place in the world, my sister, 
a special and unique place. Here, in this our land you should live, my sister. Here 
we will give you our love You are dark and beautiful, my sister. You are dark, for 
the suffering has scorched you, but you are beautiful, as beautiful to me as beauty 
itself, as sanctified to me as sanctity itself… 
I know: The villains have tortured her and made her barren… 
I say to her:… We love you my sister; you carry all the glow of 
motherhood within you, all the beauty of womanhood is in you. To you our love 
is given, you will be a sister to us, you will be bride to us, you will be a mother to 
us… 
For these sisters of mine – I am strong. 
For these sisters of mine – I am brave. 
For these sisters of mine – I will also be cruel. 
For you [I will do] anything – anything.  
 
Bartov interprets this haunting letter as simultaneously indicative of the time in which it 
was written—recalling that, in 1946, survivors began to immigrate illegally into Palestine 
with the help of Aliyah Beth—and the future-minded justifications for Zionism in the 
Middle East: 
…they [the survivors] were accepted by those who wished to see themselves as 
their saviors, accepted not only (or even primarily) as individuals but as the 
irrefutable legitimization of the struggle… to fight one’s enemies as if they were 
the Nazis, to fear defeat as if it could only spell another Auschwitz… For 
weakness was the chief characteristic of those very same Jews whose genocide 
had made survival into the highest moral imperative and any action ensuring it not 
only permissible but noble. (Bartov para. 31) 
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To begin, a Hebrew reissue of House of Dolls that included an alleged photograph of its 
indisposed heroine denotes the desire to immediately authenticate the contents of the 
narrative as historically accurate. This would deepen inevitably the impact of the books, 
further proving to soldiers and citizens alike what is at stake in defending the 
Homeland—all the while, significantly maintaining the binary between Diasporic and 
Israeli Jewry, with the latter cast as hero and savior. In supplying the extremes of the 
Sho’ah, as embodied by the violated female form and reproductive abilities, the Ministry 
of Education seems to endorse the notion that cruelty against one’s enemy is “moral” 
and, further, “noble.” It is also significant that this letter was written by a prominent 
leader of the Hagadah, an early defensive group known for its brutality, in that these 
words obliquely identify the enemy straight from the defensive lines; even in 1946, 
without Ben-Gurion’s sanction, one sees the equation of Arabs and Nazis as a 
justification for extreme military measures.  
The theme of depersonalization is well articulated in Ka-Tzetnik’s personal 
history, as has been discussed, but the question of the author’s personal identity and 
acclimation to Israeli society has not yet been fully explored. Even after emerging as 
Yehiel De-Nur, the author continued to publish pseudonymously until his death. This 
seemed to further degrade the image of the survivor, in the way that he came to 
symbolize the kind of survivor who was unable to leave their traumas in the past. Dan 
Michman, chief historian at Yad Vashem,82 expressed his opinion that “in some way Ka-
Tzetnik symbolizes the unwillingness to leave it behind and move forward. He represents 
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the desire to remain… in that terrible event. To drag it on.”83 One possible implication of 
casting De-Nur, and other survivors, as irreparably mired in the past, is that their 
presence is not conducive to the developing Zionist future. Here, the tension between the 
traumatic, victimized past and the heroic, armed future is keenly felt. 
By including Ka-Tzetnik’s books in public schools and reissuing them with new 
paratextual frameworks, the books were appropriated by the Israeli government in order 
to emplot the traumas of the past on the national level toward the aim of social coherence 
and national security. It is only by the further desubjectification of the witness that large-
scale emplotments such as these are possible, justifying cycles of violence that begin with 
the lauding of the collective dead and result in the sacrificial aggrandizement of dying for 
one’s country. In particular, the implementation of the female body—as both as a literal 
and symbolic representation of the nation’s constitutive unit, the home and family—
toward this aim constitutes further violence against survivors and De-Nur himself by 
denying the possibility of their individual testimonies. This is against De-Nur’s own 
project as, despite what his pseudonym might suggest, Ka-Tzetnik was very much in 
favor of spreading individual testimonies. The author saw himself as a conduit for a 
myriad of deceased voices, not as a single channel for the master narrative of Auschwitz. 
In this way, the modern reader’s earnest attempt to read survivor testimonies for what 
they are, and to acknowledge the traumas of the past, stands against this kind of 
historiographic emplotment.  
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IV. The Figure of the Mussulman and the Problem of Naming 
 
 
 
 Building upon the themes of trauma, depersonalization and testimony that have 
been established thus far, the final chapter of this essay will analyze the process by which 
De-Nur was finally able to reclaim his identity after it was taken from him in Auschwitz. 
This process hinges on the author’s ability, over thirty years after the liberation of the 
camps, to relinquish his concept of the “planet Auschwitz” and to integrate his past into 
his understanding of life on earth. Parallel to this movement, De-Nur was finally able to 
integrate his traumatic experiences into his present-tense self; he was finally able to 
publicly answer when someone used the name “De-Nur.” In order to achieve this, the 
author made further use of the imagination in the process of writing and testimony, as the 
last two books of the series illustrate. 
 The first half of the Salamandra sextet focuses on the conditions and 
consequences of desubjectification in the camps and, in the second half, De-Nur focuses 
his attention on metaphysical interpretations of the Holocaust and a further investigation 
of his own identity. These questions come to the fore because De-Nur survived the state 
of the Mussulman—a condition that most did not survive—and resulted in his ability to 
tell the tale that went largely unspoken. This ability to testify—a sacred responsibility, as 
De-Nur describes it at length—is rooted in his survivor guilt, another probable cause of 
his inability to write in the first person under his own name. This distancing mechanism 
not only allowed him to process his own experiences and to convey what he believed to 
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have been the experiences of his siblings, but also to write under the KZ pseudonym that 
entailed the probability of destruction. As the final book of the series, Shivitti: A Vision, 
explores in detail, the author was not able to fully inhabit his own subjectivity until he 
underwent LSD therapy in 1978—that is, until he deliberately submerged himself in the 
chemically induced visions of his own imagination. 
 In order to understand how significant De-Nur’s survival is in the face of the 
Holocaust, it is useful to establish a basic understanding of the physical and philosophic 
conditions of the Mussulman. In the hierarchy of the Lager, the Mussulmen constitute the 
bottommost wrung, as they are emaciated, too weak to work, often among the Häftlinge 
who have spent the duration incarcerated, and, due to malnutrition and the length of time 
they have spent there, have lost the will (or the physical ability) to wait in line for the thin 
soup, get out of bed for the Selektions, or engage in a conversation—much less, often, 
remember their own names. These are the extreme victims of the dehumanization 
effected by the Nazis, and so too are they the furthest from the vitality of their pre-
incarceration selves.  
Because they were no longer viable sources of production for the Reich, the 
Mussulmen were rooted out in Selektions for the crematoria, and so, coupled with their 
weakened condition, the survival of this state was incredibly rare. As Giorgio Agamben 
has observed, “The untestifiable, that to which no one has borne witness, has a name. In 
the jargon of the camp, it is der Muselman, literally ‘the Muslim.’”84 The lowest of the 
camps, this group received their name because they appeared to have completely 
evacuated themselves—to be animate, but not cognitively present—and this was 
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compared to a Muslim’s expression while in prayer. The term for the malnourished in 
Auschwitz seems inherently rooted in the racism of the camps and, sadly, the application 
of this term to individuals entailed their dismissal by both the Häftlinge and the SS. 
Because everyone was struggling to survive, the other inmates saw the Mussulman as 
someone with whom they could not longer work; the prisoners who “collaborated” saw 
them as easy targets against which to aggrandize themselves in the eyes of the SS; and 
the SS, finally, saw them as disposable and disgusting.85 These people were seen as 
having given up entirely, despite the largely physical reasons for their status, and so 
everyone gave up on them.  
 The extreme figure of the Mussulman, exhibited in many photographs and footage 
taken during the liberation, may be part of the reason why survivors were received with 
such incredulity in Israel and why so many of their testimonies were repressed. The very 
fact of survival in contrast with the death of so many people was often interpreted as an 
act of collusion with the enemy, implying that these people must have done something 
wrong in order to survive.86 This supposition is represented in the dichotomy between the 
functionaries, people in the camps who held positions that did not involve manual labor 
and often received higher food rations, and the rest of the inmates who did not receive 
these benefits and, consequently, were less likely to survive.87 Primo Levi, in his last 
book, titled these two extremes The Drowned and the Saved, implying that those who 
died were the true witnesses of Auschwitz because they experienced it at its worst 
without going to the often culpable lengths that others did in order to survive. Agamben 
                                                 
85
 Ibid., 43. 
86
 Galia Glasner-Heled, “Reader, Writer, and Holocaust Literature: The Case of Ka Tzetnik,” Israel Studies 
12 num. 3 (Fall 2007): 125. 
87
 Milner, Iris. “The ‘Gray Zone’ Revisited: The Concentrationary Universe in Ka. Tzetnik’s Literary 
Testimony,” Jewish Social Studies: History, Culture, and Society n.s. 14 no. 2 (Winter 2008), 113. 
Allen      70
captures this specific angle of survivor’s guilt: “This is the specific aporia of Auschwitz: 
it is the site in which it is not decent to remain decent, in which those who believed 
themselves to preserve their dignity and self-respect experience shame with respect to 
those who did not.” 88 While, in the Lager, the Mussulmen were seen as having given up 
the will to live, those who exercised that will later felt the Mussulmen had actually 
responded appropriately to the ethical situation in Auschwitz—taking, for example, that 
if eating meant that someone else did not, then the ethical decision would be not to eat. 
But the human survival instincts, combined with the strength of the narrative impulse, are 
simply not programmed that way, and it is likely that the Mussulmen who appeared so 
placid may have done so due to physical and psychological depletion rather than moral 
superiority.  
The many shades of Jewish complicity during this period are the subject of 
another essay entirely, but suffice it to say that degrees range loosely from the Judenrät 
(Jewish council members representing the ghettos and involved in selecting Jews for 
deportation during Aktions), the Kapos (people forced to oversee labor projects), other 
functionaries (such as cooks or office workers), and the Sonderkommando (teams almost 
entirely comprised of Jews, who were forced to aid in the disposal of corpses from the 
gas chambers)89. It seems clear from this (admittedly reductive) list that those mentioned 
above are largely acting within the boundaries of the enclosed Nazi system; it is difficult 
to judge who is better and who is worse when everyone is dehumanized by their 
environment. Iris Milner has argued in favor of Ka-Tzetnik’s books as a more humanistic 
representation of the hierarchical system of the Lager: “Contrary to the assertion that the 
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novels tend to exaggerate the dichotomy between functionaries and simple inmates… the 
works in fact cancel the difference between them and regard these options as two poles of 
an unbroken spectrum of dehumanization.” 90  The compassion with which De-Nur 
rendered this spectrum of human adaptions to atrocity may be due to the fact that he 
viewed it from the bottom up, as he himself survived the state of the Mussulman by 
hiding in an coal bin in the back of a van bound for the crematorium.91  
 De-Nur’s status as a survivor is defined by his escape from the crematoria, as his 
name exemplifies. Yehiel De-Nur was born Yehiel Feiner in Poland in 1917, and chose 
the name De-Nur for himself after making his Aliyah to Israel.92 The name, De-Nur, 
means “From the Fire” in Hebrew, standing as a direct reference to the crematoria and to 
the etymology of the word “holocaust” as well. The word comes from the Latin meaning 
for “burned offering,” rendering it a very problematic signifier for the events of this 
period. In describing his rejection of the word “holocaust” as a viable signifier for the 
period, Agamben invokes both its religious and historical nature: “Not only does the term 
imply an unacceptable equation between crematoria and altars; it also continues a 
semantic heredity that is from its inception anti-Semitic This is why we will never make 
use of this term.”93 In Israel, this period is referred to as the Sho’ah, “the Catastrophe,” a 
term that excludes the religious implications. Some have even taken issue with this 
terminology, claiming that “‘I do not like the word ‘shoah’; Shoah is a sudden event, 
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whereas what happened had its own preambles.’”94 By this line of thinking, attributed to 
the Israeli writer Ahron Appelfeld, even the word Sho’ah is an inappropriate signifier as 
it suggests that the large-scale extermination efforts of an entire people was an isoable 
event in history; whereas European Anti-Semitism had been “fermenting” for a long time 
and, indeed, this event would not have been possible without it.95 As Peter Haidu rightly 
points out, “The naming of an event bears with it implications of various kinds: 
narratological, theological, historical, political, rhetorical, and philosophical.” 96 
Understanding it this way, the words that one uses to describe the time period between 
1939 and 1945 conveys much about one’s perspective on the issue, and the cultural 
framework within which these understandings operate.97  
Upon his arrival in Israel, De-Nur chose to live under a name that implied the 
conditions of his survival at the same time that he wrote under a pseudonym that 
indicated his depersonalization in the Lager. As has been shown, the intricacies of the 
relationship between these two identities manifest in his writing. Questions of the ability 
of the imagination to refute or reclaim the past, in connection with depersonalization and 
identity, crystallize in Shivitti: A Vision. Published in Hebrew in 1987, the final book of 
the Salamandra sextet describes De-Nur’s experiences in LSD therapy, a program that 
was designed specifically to treat the victims of the camps by the Dutch professor Jan 
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Bastiaans. After having his subjects lie naked in a darkened room after an injection of 
LSD, Prof. Bastiaans asked questions that provoked memories of the Lager experience 
and recorded their responses on tape.  
 
De-Nur, on the right, pictured with Prof. Bastiaans 
 
With this basic premise, Shivitti contains two discursive levels: one, the transcribed audio 
recordings of De-Nur as he underwent LSD and verbalized his hallucinations; and, 
secondly, De-Nur’s commentary on the experience and how he began to interpret it once 
he came down. Though De-Nur is paratextually named at the beginning of each section, 
with the heading “LSD treatment of Mr. De-Nur,” and self-identifies in both his verbal 
and written responses, the book was still published under the name Ka-Tzetnik 135633.  
 In Shivitti, the author witnesses mystical visions of Auschwitz, his experiences, 
and his deceased family, and considers these in relation to his identity. While describing 
his time in the coal bin in the back of the van to Prof. Bastiaans, De-Nur reenacts his plea 
to God: 
I lift my eyes to the skies of Auschwitz and I see Nucleus on his throne, 
under his majestic mushroom dome. And the dome outgrows Auschwitz, his 
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birthplace, and is borne to the four directions of the celestial compass, till it has 
completely blotted out the sun and the firmament… 
Oh, Lord, let me survive, Let me hold out… I took an oath, I made a vow 
to be their voice. Spare me, Lord, spare me! No one will be left alive. Oh, God, 
I’ll be witness to your fulgent presence in the letters of your name! I’ll be witness 
to your face in Auschwitz! Lord! Lord! (Ka-Tzetnik 41-2) 
 
The Nucleus and mushroom cloud, among other symbols, occupy their own position in 
the unique arrangement of Ka-Tzetnik’s personal mythos—one that cannot be fully 
explored here. In short, the “Nucleus” to which De-Nur refers is the god of Auschwitz, 
the singularity of evil that commanded the wills of men to harm each other and 
themselves. The Nucleus is the impetus of the “mushroom dome,” the cloud of ashes that 
rise from the crematoria and darken the air. Seeing this, De-Nur recounts his promise to 
his Lord, the Hebrew God, that he will bear witness for all of those who could not do so 
for themselves; if survived, he would channel the voices of the dead into the world of the 
living so that they would never be forgotten. Given all of this background, De-Nur’s 
choice to retain his KZ identity in favor of a personal name further indicates his intention 
to testify for the dead in the rejection of himself due to survivor’s guilt. This rejection 
began when, after the liberation of Auschwitz, De-Nur returned to Poland and sought out 
the remaining copy of the only book he wrote before his incarceration, a book of poetry 
published under the name Yehiel Feiner, and burned it.98 
 All of these aspects of De-Nur’s identity and status as an author seem rooted in 
survivor’s guilt, as has been discussed, and it is precisely this condition that Prof. 
Bastiaan’s program was designed to treat. Throughout the first half of the book, De-Nur 
remains skeptical that the program will work and is more honest about his visions in his 
written analyses than in the transcriptions of his speech, by both his own and Prof. 
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Bastiaans accounts, but a pivotal realization in the middle of the book sheds new light on 
the entire Salamandra series: 
The number on top of this page of manuscript has just jumped out at me. I can’t 
believe my eyes: I’ve filled dozens of folio pages with tiny letters without even 
realizing the newness of what I’m doing: I am writing in the first person! … All 
I’ve ever written is in essence a personal journal, a testimonial on paper of I, I, I: I 
who witnessed…I who experienced…I who lived through….I, I, I, till half 
through a piece, I suddenly had to transform I to he. I felt the split, the ordeal, the 
alienation of it, and worst of all—may God forgive me—I felt like the Writer of 
Literature. But still I knew unless I hid behind the third person, I wouldn’t have 
been able to write at all. And lo and behold, here I am in the thick of the 
manuscript and totally unaware of how naturally I am allowing—from the first 
line onward—the connection with I. (Ka-Tzetnik 135633) 
 
Here, De-Nur becomes consciously aware of the process that has been advancing since 
the beginning of the book: with the advent of LSD therapy, causing him to mentally 
confront his past in the form of mystic visions, the author has subconsciously merged his 
pre- and post-incarceration identities into a unified, writing whole. He is able to stand in 
his own testimony, his own name, and to deliver it undeterred by fear of judgment and 
exposed individuality against the collective to whom he felt that his life was owed.  
 As he comes to terms with himself, so he also de-mystifies his experience in the 
Lager and reconciles the reality of Auschwitz as having occurred on the same planet as 
the one he now inhabits, a post-Holocaust world. There is a crucial turning point in De-
Nur’s visions, wherein he imagines one of the SS guards yawning in the morning over a 
vanload of corpses to be taken to the crematorium, and he understands that this man, the 
guard, is human too.99 Under the influence of LSD, De-Nur finds the compassion and 
mobility of mind to see that this man is not yawning because is evil and without feeling, 
but because it is early in the morning and if De-Nur himself were in that situation, then he 
                                                 
99
 Ka-Tzetnik 135633. Shivitti: A Vision (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), 113-4. 
Allen      76
might yawn as well.100 In this way, spurred by a vision of a yawn, De-Nur realizes that 
humanity is capable of this kind of evil, and that it does not take supernatural or extra-
terrestrial influence to drive man to such atrocious lengths. De-Nur develops his new 
understanding of “planet Auschwitz” as the planet earth in the afterword of the text: 
Long ago I was a seeker of solitude, distancing myself from human contact and 
interference, so that I could be alone with Auschwitz. But nowadays Auschwitz 
has lumbered its way to everyone’s doorstep. Wherever there is humankind, there 
is Auschwitz. It wasn’t Satan who created the Nucleus, but you and I! (Ka-
Tzetnik 107) 
 
The extent of De-Nur’s survival guilt is exemplified by his desire to “be alone with the 
Auschwitz,” and, by extension, all those who died nameless in its crematoria. Here, De-
Nur moves away from the mystified explanation of his experiences that he developed for 
himself over the years, in order to compartmentalize the past from the present, though 
this actually resulted in the continued presence of the dead in his life via his inability to 
integrate trauma into his post-incarceration life. In place of this, De-Nur moves toward 
the realistic, empirical realization that all the members of the Lager system were human 
beings, and so all understandings of humanity must be adjusted to accommodate for the 
possibility (and historical reality) of atrocity.101 This sentiment connects with De-Nur’s 
explanation of his loss of consciousness at the Eichmann Trial—an interpretation that 
was delivered firsthand in an interview given on 60 Minutes in 1983.102 Given that De-
Nur underwent Prof. Bastiaan’s therapy in 1978, it is likely that this insight into his own 
behavior was only emerged after he had engaged in this practice. This means that, after 
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all, De-Nur was finally able to connect with empirical reality only after the deliberate 
exercise of his imagination at the chemical level. 
 Over the course of the Salamandra series, Ka-Tzetnik grapples with his past, his 
grief, and his identity—culminating, finally, in the author’s ability to integrate the past 
into the continued narrative of his life. The insights he gained about the reality of 
Auschwitz on earth, however, may have been less than comforting, as he realized that it 
had occurred not in another world but in the same one in which he now lived peaceably. 
The extreme events of the Holocaust, “an event at the limits,” have shown the ethical 
lows to which people can sink in order to survive, the form of the Mussulman who 
seemed (and was treated as) inhuman, and the degree to which people can be cruel to 
each other—indeed, cruel enough to bring the latter forms into existence. In this way, the 
dignity of the human species is lowered by the tactics of dehumanization and 
depersonalization; acknowledging this, De-Nur was able to reclaim his subjectivity and 
identity from these tactics by the processes of the imagination, memory, and the 
externalization of narratives to a willing listener.  
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V. Conclusion 
 
 
 Due to the extreme violence and dehumanizing conditions that Jews, and others, 
endured during the Holocaust, many have purported that the period is unrepresentable 
because of the non-survivor’s inability to imagine such terrible conditions and the 
ineptitude of language to appropriately depict them.103 This essay has argued, however, 
that the imagination actually facilitates this kind of representation, despite the 
problematic nature of this claim, by allowing the dehumanized individual to reclaim their 
subjectivity via the creation of testimony. By developing a narrative that is uniquely 
meaningful to the individual, it is possible to integrate trauma into the greater self-
narrative of one’s life, and so the relegation of extreme trauma to the realm of the 
unspeakable entails further violence against individuals who have already experienced 
dehumanizing conditions and, consequently, the loss of their identity.  
Ka-Tzetnik’s books crystallize this notion, in the way that they explore the 
rupture of identity between the pre- and post-incarceration selves, the conditions and 
ramifications of sexual violence against Jews, the figure of the Mussulman, and the 
subsequent process of reclaiming one’s individuality from the chorus of voices that 
remain on that “other planet” he tried to represent both in legal and written testimonies. 
Though the historical veracity of his representations are largely contested, the work of 
Ka-Tzetnik 135633 remains an intriguing entry point into the historical realities of the 
Holocaust in the way that they pose questions such as these for consideration, and, 
moreover, insist that these difficult concepts remain integral to modern studies of the 
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period. In particular, the study of female experiences and sexual traumas during the 
Holocaust should not be swept aside, and neither should the earnest study of the 
Mussulman in modern scholarship. 
During the Holocaust, Nazi tactics of dehumanization led to the depersonalization 
of the people they persecuted. This loss of identity, rooted in constant inhumane 
treatment, produced an immense narrative impulse in many survivors—an impulse to not 
only convey what they had been through, so as to inhabit their personal identities and 
experiences, but also to preserve the individual self against the generalizing modes of 
historiography. The imagination’s function in the process of narrativizing memories is as 
a gateway that allows a survivor to reclaim their subjectivity from the desubjectified 
space of the Lager; whereas, on the cultural level, the viability of the imagination—that 
is, the subjective—may be dismissed in favor of timelines, chronicles, and annals as a 
superior form of “truth.”104 Whether or not history is acknowledged as such, scholars 
such as Haydn White have argued that history is a narrative in itself, and thus is itself 
inextricable from human subjectivities and imaginative processes in the sense that many 
disparate events must be assembled into a coherent narrative. By this understanding, 
histories are nationally constructed narratives that are pliable to the cultural and political 
positions of the nation, and historical events can be emplotted in those histories more 
easily if the subjective is removed from them and refitted to suit the nation’s tangible, 
forward-thinking goals in a generalized mode.  
The danger of this, of course, is that historiographic representations of the past are 
necessarily inflected by the dominant wills for the future, which risk distorting the 
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realities of the past. In this sense, the role of national memory in the construction of 
historographic narratives entails the possibility—and, sometimes, the necessity—of 
forgetting and elision. Taduesz Borowski’s description of his fear that the Germans 
would win the war and efface its subjugating history from its annals reflects the cultural 
possibility of various emplotments: 
If the Germans win the war, what will the world know about us? They will 
erect huge buildings, highways, factories, soaring monuments. Our hands will be 
placed under every brick, and our backs will carry the steel rails and the slabs of 
concrete. They will kill off our families, our sick, our aged. They will murder our 
children.  
And we shall be forgotten… (Borowski 132) 
 
Borowski’s sentiment denotes the possibility that history will be rewritten by the 
conqueror, casting itself as hero and negating the history of the slaves whose labor 
constructed this new society. By denying the witness a position in historical 
representation, nationalized narratives prevail over the violence they have already 
wrought. Given this understanding, in addition to everything that has been established 
about the narrative processes of testimony, the subjective stands as an additional form of 
historical knowledge—despite the difficulties that this may suggest.  
 Overall, the many moving pieces of this issue point to the preservation of the 
individual, the subjective, in addition to the generalizing narratives of historiography. 
Taking only the latter, which are pliable to the positions and goals of the nations of who 
generate them, too often denies the uniqueness of individual circumstances and 
perspectives—indeed, the very conditions of personhood that are at stake in genocide. By 
including the individual and the imaginative in historical understandings of the 
Holocaust—despite the dubious veracity of these representations—history remembers 
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people instead of numbers, and stories instead of statistics. As Peter Haidu points out, it 
must indeed be both, as one contextualizes the other: 
German sources reveal the bureaucratic complexity of the process of 
extermination, but they deal with people only in the aggregate. The situation is 
reversed in Jewish sources, which tell of particular experiences, but without 
grasping the larger process in which they were involved. (Haidu 280) 
 
Understanding that the Nazi annihilation system dehumanized everyone involved, the 
importance of both testimony and documentation are crucial to not only reclaiming one’s 
subjectivity from the traumatic past but also to understanding the degree to which real 
people can be treated as less than, thereby justifying further violence. 
In what may be the culminating passage of his memoir, The Human Race, Robert 
Antelme insists on the fact of personhood despite the efforts of racism, hierarchies, and 
divisive violence among populations: 
Yet there is no ambiguity: we’re still men, and we shall not end otherwise than as 
men… It’s an SS fantasy to believe that we have an historical mission to change 
species, and as this mutation is occurring too slowly, they kill. No, this 
extraordinary sickness is nothing other than a culminating moment in man’s 
history. And that means two things. First, that the solidity and stability of the 
species is being put to the test. Next, that the variety of the relationships between 
men, their color, their customs, the classes they are formed into mask a truth that 
here, at the boundary of nature, at the point where we approach our limits, appears 
with absolute clarity: namely, that there are not several human races, there is only 
one human race. (Antelme 218)  
 
Antelme’s moving plea for unity and interpersonal equality—a condition that, he claims, 
is already existent among humanity but is broken down by the social constructions of 
racism and other forms of subjugation—demonstrates the survivor’s ability to reclaim 
personhood from their desubjectified past, because their innate humanity cannot be taken 
from them. Narrative is one of the ways in which the traumatic past can be overcome in 
order to achieve an “interior liberation,” a reclamation of personhood and culturally 
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reciprocal discourse, in a post-Holocaust world.105 In effect, the depths of misogyny and 
racism that studies of this period conveys should not be taken as isolable extremes, but as 
examples of the extensive violence that the human race is capable of when divided into 
subhuman categories.  
Against this, the study of the imagination as well as history stand as a reminder to 
never repeat the hatred and genocides of the past, in that they remind of us the value of 
the individual. A passage from House of Dolls depicts the depersonalization of the 
victims, on the other side of which we may draw a crucial conclusion: 
Ranks of girls march along. Precisely six abreast. Each is vigilant not to step out 
of line or lag behind an iota. The gun barrels are fixed at them like the pupils of 
German eyes… The captives forgot where they came from. Forgot that once past, 
there had been years when they had lived. (Ka-Tzetnik 118) 
 
The duty of modern civilization, then, is never to forget.106  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
105
 Primo Levi, Survival in Auschwitz (New York: Touchstone Books, 1993), 9. 
106
 To view an interactive archive of the names, photographs, and histories of the known victims of the 
Sho’ah, please visit the Yad Vashem website, where you can also found a wealth of other materials such as 
video survivor testimonies: http://db.yadvashem.org/names/search.html?language=en 
Allen      83
Bibliography 
 
Adam Resurrected. Dir. Paul Shrader. Perf. Jeff Goldblum, Willem Defoe, Derek,  Jacobi. 
 Image Entertainment & 3L Filmverleih, 2008. DVD. 
Agamben, Giorgio, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness 
 and the Archive. New York: Zone Books, 1999.  
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
 Nationalism. London: Verso, 2006.  
Antelme, Robert, trans. Jeffrey Haight and Annie Mahler. The Human Race. Evanston: 
 The Marlboro Press/Northwestern, 1992.  
Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. New York: 
 Penguin, 1965. 
Bartov, Omer. “Kitsch and Sadism in Ka-Tzetnik’s Other Planet: Israeli Youth Imagine 
 the Holocaust,” Indiana University Press, Jan 31 1997. 
Borowski, Taduesz, trans. Michael Kandel. This Way for the Gas, Ladies and Gentlemen. 
 New York: Penguin, 1959.  
Brison, Susan. Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of a Self. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
 University Press, 2002. 
Celan, Paul, trans. Susan H. Gillespie. Corona: Selected Poems of Paul Celan. 
 Barrytown, NY: Station Hill, 2013. 
Derrida, Jacques, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg. Demeure: Fiction and Testimony. 
 Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.  
Allen      84
Edvardson, Cordelia, trans. Joel Agee. Burned Child Seeks the Fire. Boston: Beacon 
 Press, 1987.  
Engle, David. The Holocaust: The Third Reich and the Jews. Essex: Pearson Education, 
 Ltd., 2000. 
Esposito, Roberto, trans. Timonthy Campbell. Bíos: Biopolitics and Philosophy. 
 Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008.  
Friedlander, Saul, ed. Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the “Final 
 Solution.” Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.  
Glasner-Heled, Galia. “Reader, Writer, and Holocaust Literature: The Case of Ka-
 Tzetnik,” Israel Studies 12 num. 3 (Fall 2007): 109-133. 
Hedgepeth, Sonja M. and Rochel G. Saidel, Eds. Sexual Violence Against Jewish Women 
 During the Holocaust. Lebanon: University Press of New England, 2010.  
Levi, Primo, trans. Stuart Woolf. Survival in Auschwitz (orig. If This is a Man). New 
 York: Touchstone, 1993.  
Levine, Michael G. A Weak Messianic Power: Figures of a Time to Come in Benjamin, 
 Derrida, and Celan. New York: Fordham University Press, 2014. 
Ka-Tzetnik 135633, trans. Moshe M. Kohn. House of Dolls. New York: Simon and 
 Shuster, Inc., 1956.  
Ka-Tzetnik 135633, trans. Nina De-Nur. Phoenix Over the Galilee. New York: Pyramid 
 Publications, 1977.  
Ka-Tzetnik 135633, trans. Moshe M. Kohn. Piepel. Anthony Blond Ltd., 1961.  
Ka-Tzetnik 135633, trans. Eliyah Nike De-Nur and Lisa Herman. Shivitti: A Vision. New 
 York: Harper and Row, 1987. 
Allen      85
Milner, Iris. “The ‘Gray Zone’ Revisited: The Concentrationary Universe in Ka. 
 Tzetnik’s Literary Testimony,” Jewish Social Studies: History, Culture, Society, 
 14, no. 2 (Winter 2008): 113-155. 
Night and Fog. Dir. Alain Resnais. Argos Films, 1955. DVD. 
Popkin, Jeremy. “Ka-Tzetnik 13566: The Survivor as Pseudonym,” New Literary History 
 33, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 343-355. 
“The Devil is a Gentleman.” 60 Minutes. New York: Jewish Media Fund, 1997, 1983. 
 Recorded television segment. VHS. 
Zertal, Idith, trans. Chaya Galai. Israel’s Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood. 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.  
 
 
